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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the SEC on liability and damages in a complaint against defendant and his company for the purchase and resale of unregistered securities. The court affirmed summary judgment as to liability against TJM and defendant where they failed to show that the sales fell under an exception to the registration requirements under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77e. Because defendants failed to identify anything in the summary judgment record that would show the transactions at issue occurred in Texas, the court rejected their claim under Rule 504(b)(1)(iii), which allows offerings and sales to avoid registration requirements if they are conducted exclusively according to state law exemptions from registration that permit general solicitation and general advertising so long as sales are made only to accredited investors. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring all future transactions, in ordering a permanent injunction from future securities law violations, and in disgorgement of all revenue. View "SEC v. Kahlon" on Justia Law

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Petitioner challenged the Commission's decision to sustain FINRA's decision to permanently bar him from membership and from working with any of its affiliated members. The DC Circuit held that the Commission reasonably grounded its decision in the record, which extensively evidenced petitioner's acts of misappropriation, his prolonged efforts to cover his tracks through falsehoods, and his repeated and deliberate obstruction of investigators. The court remanded with respect to the permanent bar on petitioner's registration with FINRA and affiliation with its members for the Commission to determine in the first instance whether Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), has any bearing on his case. View "Saad v. SEC" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s convictions of securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both. The convictions arose from Appellant’s writing of false opinion letters so that his two co-conspirators could sell stock to the public in a “pump and dump” scheme. On appeal, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in light of his interpretation of section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act and that the district court constructively amended the indictment in its instructions to the jury. The First Circuit held (1) even if Appellant’s interpretation of section 3(a)(9) was correct, the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) Appellant’s constructive amendment claim was without merit. View "United States v. Weed" on Justia Law

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After the SEC determined that petitioner's conduct violated various securities-fraud provisions, the DC Circuit upheld the Commission's findings that the statements in petitioner's emails were false or misleading and that he possessed the requisite intent. However, the court held that petitioner did not "make" false statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j, because petitioner's boss, and not petitioner himself, retained "ultimate authority" over the statements. The court reasoned that, while petitioner's boss was the "maker" of the false statements, petitioner played an active role in perpetrating the fraud by folding the statements into emails he sent directly to investors in his capacity as director of investment banking, and by doing so with an intent to deceive. Therefore, petitioner's conduct infringed the other securities-fraud provisions he was charged with violating. The court set aside sanctions and remanded for the Commission to reassess the appropriate remedies. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review in part, vacated the sanctions, and remanded. View "Lorenzo v. SEC" on Justia Law

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FHFA, as conservator for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and analogous "Blue Sky laws," the Virginia Securities Act, and the D.C. Securities Act. The FHFA alleged that representations regarding underwriting criteria for certificates tied to private-label securitizations (PLLs) was a material misstatement. The district court rendered judgment in favor of the FHFA under Sections 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act, and analogous provisions of the Virginia and D.C. Blue Sky laws. The district court also awarded rescission and ordered defendants to refund the FHFA a total adjusted purchase price of approximately $806 million in exchange for the certificates. The Second Circuit found no merit in defendants' argument and held that defendants failed to discharge their duty under the Securities Act to disclose fully and fairly all of the information necessary for investors to make an informed decision whether to purchase the certificates at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this second appeal in an SEC enforcement action against Marlon Quan and entities he controlled, including the hedge fund SCAF, three investors in SCAF challenged orders entered by the district court pertaining to the receivership, the entry of judgment against SCAF, and the pro rata distribution of SCAF's assets to investors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the investors have identified no error in the district court's approval of the First Stipulation, which was within the district court's broad discretionary power; the district court did not abuse its discretion in the approval of the Second Stipulation; there was no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in applying a pro rata distribution to all investors; and the investors have waived their arguments regarding legal fees and expenses. View "SEC v. Topwater Exclusive Fund III" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Lopez created financial investment business entities and solicited funds from family and friends. He received approximately $450,000 total from five people, stating that he intended to invest in companies such as Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, Wells Fargo, Visa, American Express, and Procter & Gamble. Documents the investors signed reserved Lopez’s discretion to invest where he saw fit. Lopez deposited their funds into accounts that he controlled and never invested in the companies listed in his advertising materials. Lopez used much of the money for personal expenses. Lopez unilaterally changed the terms of each investors’ promissory note; they were not aware of these changes, did not give Lopez permission to make them, and did not sign documents. After an investor complained to the Indiana Secretary of State and the IRS investigated Lopez’s businesses, Lopez was convicted of 15 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; four counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; and securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 77ff(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred in allowing a government witness to testify that payments Lopez made to his investors were “lulling payments,” that the government’s references to Bernie Madoff in its closing argument denied him a fair trial, that the court erred in denying Lopez’s request to label his witness an “expert” in front of the jury, that the court improperly prevented him from introducing extrinsic evidence of a government witness's prior inconsistent statement. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged insider-trading side deals in connection with the sale of a small aerospace manufacturing company, Kreisler, and insufficient disclosure to stockholders regarding the sales process. Before the sale, Kreisler was offered to dozens of potential acquirers. Several bidders emerged. A fairness opinion was rendered and a special committee ultimately recommended the sale. The transaction was approved by written consent of a majority of the shares outstanding. A block of shares of just over 50 percent executed a stockholder support agreement providing for approval of the transaction, so there was no stockholder vote. An Information Statement was provided to stockholders to permit them to decide whether to seek appraisal. A majority of Kreisler’s board of directors are independent and disinterested, and its charter contains an exculpation provision. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint, finding that even accepting the well-pled allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. View "Kahn v. Stern" on Justia Law

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The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 77p(b)–(f), 78bb(f)), bars private class actions based on state law in cases where the plaintiff alleges a material falsehood or omission connected to the purchase or sale of most federally-regulated securities. In this case, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and various fiduciary duties under Massachusetts law. The district judge held that SLUSA barred his claims, and dismissed them with prejudice. The panel held that dismissals pursuant to SLUSA's class-action bar must be for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—and therefore without prejudice—rather than on the merits. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent it concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred. View "Hampton v. Pacific Investment Management Co." on Justia Law

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Globus, a publicly-traded medical device company, terminated its relationship with one of its distributors, Vortex, in keeping with a policy of moving toward in-house sales. Several months later, in August 2014, Globus executives alerted shareholders that sales growth had slowed, attributed the decline in part to the decision to terminate its contract with Vortex, and revised Globus’s revenue guidance downward for fiscal year 2014. The price of Globus shares fell by approximately 18% the following day. Globus shareholders contend the company and its executives violated the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 and defrauded investors by failing to disclose the company’s decision to terminate the distributor contract and by issuing revenue projections that failed to account for this decision. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case. Globus had no duty to disclose either its decision to terminate its relationship with Vortex or the completed termination of that relationship. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead that a drop in sales was inevitable; that the revenue projections were false when made; nor that that Globus incorporated anticipated revenue from Vortex in its projections. View "Williams v. Globus Medical, Inc." on Justia Law