Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Hirsch, Robyn Hirsch, and Hirsch, LLP, claimed that they lost money invested in securities that were part of a "Ponzi" scheme. In 2002, plaintiffs' accountant, EisnerAmper LLP, referred them to Marc Scudillo, a financial advisor employed by Amper Financial Services, LLC (AFS), for investment planning. Scudillo also served as a representative for Securities America, Inc. (SAI), a separate corporation that served as a broker-dealer handling securities transactions. Plaintiffs hired Scudillo and invested in a portfolio with a conservative investment strategy. Their relationship was not reduced to a written contract. On Scudillo's recommendation, plaintiffs purchased securitized notes from Medical Provider Financial Corporation (Med Cap) totaling $550,000. Plaintiffs signed two applications with SAI for the purchase of the Med Cap notes. Each SAI application contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be arbitrated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether it was proper to compel arbitration between a non-signatory and a signatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause on the basis that the parties and claims were sufficiently intertwined to warrant application of equitable estoppel. The Supreme Court held that although traditional contract principles may in certain cases warrant compelling arbitration absent an arbitration clause, the relationship of the parties in this case and the claims in dispute here, viewed alone, was insufficient to warrant application of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration.View "Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond James Financial Services required its clients (the investors) to sign an agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the handling of their investments. At issue in this case was whether Florida's statute of limitations that is applicable to a "civil action or proceeding" applies to arbitration proceedings. In 2005, the investors filed a joint claim for arbitration against Raymond James, alleging federal and state securities violations and negligent supervision. The investors filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that the statute of limitations applied only to judicial actions and thus did not limit the time in which to bring their arbitration claims. The trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the investors. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the investors' arbitration claims in this case were barred by the statute of limitations, holding that Florida's statute of limitations applies to arbitration because an arbitration proceeding is within the statutory term "civil action or proceeding" found in Fla. Stat. 95.011. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

An investor pursued a claim against an investment company over losses he incurred due to the failure of some of the company's bond funds. A Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration panel ruled in the investor's favor. The investment company subsequently petitioned the chancery court to vacate the award based on the alleged bias of two members of the arbitration panel. The trial court vacated the award and remanded for a second arbitration before a new panel. The court of appeals dismissed the investor's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the trial court's order did not expressly confirm or deny the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order was, in fact, an appealable order "denying confirmation" of an arbitration award under Tenn. Code Ann. 29-5-319(a)(3). Remanded.View "Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe" on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred in reversing a trial court's denial of Harold Wright's exception of res judicata. Mr. Wright was paralyzed and incapacitated by a medical accident in 1973. He received $1.7 million in damages. The court declared Mr. Wright an interdict and appointed his wife as his curatrix. In conjunction with the proceeding, the court issued an order allowing the curatrix to invest the damages in long-term bonds. No portion of the Mr. Wright's capital estate could be withdrawn from any long range investments without specific orders from the court. Through his investment bank Defendant A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (and with the court's permission), Mr. Wright received disbursements from the invested damages award. In 2002, Mrs. Wright sued Defendant alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, she argued that A.G. Edwards and its agents misappropriated the entire $1.7 million and disbursed principal in violation of the court's order. Furthermore, Mrs. Wright alleged that when one of her account managers left A.G. Edwards to work for Morgan Stanley, he took Mr. Wright's remaining principal with him. The dispute went to arbitration. While pending, Mr. Wright died, thereby terminating the interdiction proceeding. An arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Defendants. Mr. Wright's estate then filed a motion with the district court, and Defendants filed several exceptions including an exception of res judicata where they contended the arbitration proceeding precluded further court action. The trial court denied the exception, and the appellate court reversed, dismissing the estate's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration award was unconfirmed, and therefore did not have a preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Interdiction of Harold Wright" on Justia Law

Defendants, individual investors, sought to arbitrate claims against plaintiff that arose when the investors purchased allegedly fraudulent securities directly from Inofin. Defendants contended that they were plaintiff's customers because they purchased Inofin securities on the advice of an attorney who, though lacking any formal affiliation with plaintiff, was a business and personal acquaintance of a registered representative of plaintiff. The court held that defendants were not "customers" of plaintiff within the meaning of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration provisions. To compel arbitration here would be to expand the scope of the arbitration agreement beyond what the text permitted and the parties intended. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Raymond James Financial Services v. Cary" on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan filed an action seeking to enjoin arbitration proceedings on the ground that under the controlling FINRA Rule, defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan entitled to compel arbitration of their dispute. In their FINRA arbitration claim, defendants asserted that Morgan Keegan engaged in misconduct relating to the valuation and marketing of certain bond funds purchased by defendants through their brokerage firm. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in holding that Morgan Keegan was not subject to FINRA arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan, within the meaning of the disputed FINRA Rule 12200, and, therefore, were not entitled to invoke the mandatory arbitration provision contained in that rule. View "Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

National Union appealed from the district court's award of consequential damages to plaintiffs, following a jury trial, for National Union's breach of its duty to defendant plaintiffs in a securities arbitration. At issue was whether consequential damages, which were traditionally available for breach of contract claims, were also available for a claim of breach of a duty to defend an insured under Connecticut law, and if so, whether they could include damages for harm to reputation and loss of income. Absent a precedential decision from the Connecticut courts, the court certified the two issues. View "Ryan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins." on Justia Law

Two individuals brought suit as individuals and on behalf of a putative class of investors, alleging that Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. (Stifel) and two of its employees, Neil Harrison and Roger Compton, violated federal securities law. Stifel and Compton (Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations failed to satisfy the requirements for class action claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and dismissed Plaintiffs' compliant with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the district court's order with respect to Plaintiffs' individual claims, holding the district court erred in dismissing the claims without either staying the claims pending arbitration or undertaking an analysis of the claims under the PSLRA; and (2) affirmed the district court's order as it applied to Plaintiffs' class claims, holding that the court correctly determined that the complained failed to state viable class claims under Rule 23. Remanded. View "McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co." on Justia Law