Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in California state court for business-related torts. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint and re-filed his action in the federal district court, alleging several federal securities law violations. The federal court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and filed the present action in a Tennessee state court, pleading three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by Plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not preclude the plaintiff from later re-filing an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. Remanded. View "Cooper v. Glasser" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an interlocutory appeal by the Court of Chancery of a preliminary injunction halting consummation of a stock purchase agreement under which Vivendi, S.A. would have divested itself of its controlling interest in Appellee Activision Blizzard, Inc., and an Activision stockholder. Appellees convinced the trial court that the company’s charter required that a majority of the public stockholders vote in favor of the transaction. The relevant provision applied to "any merger, business combination, or similar transaction" involving Vivendi and Activision. The trial court held that Activision's purchase of its own stock would be a business combination because significant value would be transferred to Vivendi in exchange for Activision's acquisition of a newly-formed Vivendi subsidiary that held Vivendi's Activision stock. In October 2013, the Supreme Court reversed, and this opinion set forth the basis for its decision. View "Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al. v. Hayes, et al." on Justia Law

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The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds.View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether the Chancery Court was required to dismiss a Delaware derivative complaint after a California federal court entered final judgment dismissing the same complaint brought by different stockholders. The Chancery Court determined it was not required to give preclusive effect to the California judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court erred in its determination: (1) the lower court held as a matter of Delaware law that the stockholder plaintiffs in the two jurisdictions were not in privity with one another; (2) that the California stockholders were not adequate representatives of the defendant corporation; (3) California law controlled the issue, and derivative stockholders were in privity with one another because they acted on behalf of the corporation; and (4) the Chancery Court adopted a presumption of inadequacy without the record to support it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.View "Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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In 2006, a German bank organized two affiliated entities under Delaware law. One sold a class of securities (Trust Preferred Securities) as part of the bank's effort to raise capital. In 2009, the bank acquired a second German bank by merger, whereby the bank assumed an obligation of the acquired bank to make certain payments with respect to a class of the acquired bank's securities. The bank made those payments in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, Plaintiff, who is the Property Trustee for the holders of the acquiror bank's Trust Preferred Securities sued claiming the 2009 and 2010 payments on the acquired bank's securities (which was a "Parity Security") triggered a contractual obligation by the bank to make comparable payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. The bank argued that it had no such contractual obligation. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery rejected the Trustee's claim on the basis that, because the 2009 and 2010 payments were not made on "Parity Securities," the bank had no obligation to make payments on the Trust Preferred Securities. Because the Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the Court of Chancery erred, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for the Trustee.View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II" on Justia Law

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In 2009, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, in 1999 and 2000, marketed and sold to them investments, known as the 1999 Digital Options Strategy and the 2000 COINS Strategy, which were promoted as producing profits and reducing tax liabilities. Plaintiffs were charged substantial fees, but the promised benefits did not occur. The parties agree that the five-year statute of limitations for actions not otherwise provided for is applicable. The circuit court dismissed; the appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying the “discovery rule” that a limitation period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and its wrongful cause. The limitation period began to run when the IRS issued deficiency notices to plaintiffs in 2008. The complaint adequately alleged breach of fiduciary duty; that there was no basis for dismissing the claim as legally insufficient.View "Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG" on Justia Law

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Two lawsuits alleging violations of the federal securities laws were filed against Hecla Mining Company in federal court. In this action, Plaintiffs, alleged holders of a number of Hecla shares, sued derivatively to recover on behalf of Hecla the damages that the Company had suffered and will suffer from the federal securities actions and the safety violations. Defendants, several individuals associated with the Company, moved to dismiss for failure to make demand or adequately plead demand futility. The Court of Chancery granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend as to the named plaintiff, holding that Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate representation for Hecla. The Court noted, however, that the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint should not have preclusive effect on the efforts of other stockholders to investigate potential claims and, if warranted, to file suit. View "South v. Baker" on Justia Law

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The Court of Chancery held that Defendants-Appellants, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC), a subsidiary of Southern Copper Corporation's (Southern Peru) controlling shareholder, and affiliate directors of Southern Peru, breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Southern Peru and its minority stockholders by causing Southern Peru to acquire the controller’s 99.15% interest in a Mexican mining company, Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., for much more than it was worth (at an unfair price). The Plaintiff challenged the transaction derivatively on behalf of Southern Peru. The Court of Chancery found the trial evidence established that the controlling shareholder through AMC, "extracted a deal that was far better than market" from Southern Peru due to the ineffective operation of a special committee. To remedy the Defendants' breaches of loyalty, the Court of Chancery awarded the difference between the value Southern Peru paid for Minera ($3.7 billion) and the amount the Court of Chancery determined Minera was worth ($2.4 billion). The Court of Chancery awarded damages in the amount of $1.347 billion plus pre- and postjudgment interest, for a total judgment of $2.0316 billion. The Court of Chancery also awarded the Plaintiff's counsel attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of 15% of the total judgment, which amounts to more than $304 million. Defendants raised five issues on appeal pertaining to their perceived errors at trial, the valuation of the shares and companies involved and the awarding of attorneys fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that all of the Defendants' arguments were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. View "Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault Southern Copper Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff co-established Company. Plaintiff later sold his majority interest pursuant to an agreement calling for payments to Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff a security interest in Company's assets. Company subsequently applied for credit with Bank, which transaction made Plaintiff's security interest in Company's assets subordinate to Bank's. Thereafter, Company went out of business, leaving loans unpaid. Plaintiff brought claims against Bank for negligence, constructive fraud, actual fraud, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court granted Bank's motion for judgment on the evidence on all claims, including finding that Bank owed no duty to Purcell. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the issues of duty but reversed the trial court's judgment on the evidence as to Purcell's remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was not sufficient evidence presented in this case to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence on Purcell's claims of fraud, deception, and tortious interference with a contract; and (2) Purcell's relationship with Bank as a subordinate creditor did not give rise to a duty of care required to prove Purcell's claims of negligence and constructive fraud.View "Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Billie L. Redding asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, and to conclude it was error for the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to Defendants Timothy Janiak; Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., P.C.; Ray E. Petersen; and Rick Ahmann. Petitioner's case arose from a series of real estate transactions by which she sold her property to Defendants for which she would receive payments from them which would serve as her monthly income. The scheme by which Defendants paid Petitioner and their other real estate clients collapsed in 2008 (as a Ponzi scheme), and they filed for bankruptcy. Petitioner sued, alleging: (1) unlawful sale of securities; (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of contract; and (6) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner sought damages in the amount of $4,635,485.51, plus additional amounts for punitive damages, emotional distress, loss of established course of life, and consequential damages. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on several issues, the only issue before the Court was whether the "investments" Petitioner made with Defendants qualified as "securities" under the state Securities Act. The district court found that Petitioner "did not engage in a common enterprise," an essential element of an investment contract (i.e. a security), because she "did not share the risks of the investment with other investors because she agreed upon a contractually set return on her investment." Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that supervisory control was appropriate in this case and that the real estate transactions in question here were indeed securities. Accordingly the Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control. View "Redding v. Montana 1st Jud. District" on Justia Law