Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Lead plaintiff in this consolidated, but uncertified, class action securities lawsuit sued defendants alleging violations of section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78t(a). At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's lawsuit, reasoning that defendants did not have a duty to announce production failures to defendant's investors immediately and, in any event, plaintiff failed to allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter as required by section 21D(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). The court held that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege an actionable omission or scienter for his claim and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed. The court also held that, because it affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 20(a) claim. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Respondent, First Derivative Traders, representing a class of stockholders in petitioner Janus Capital Group, Inc. ("JCG"), filed a private action under the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5, alleging that JCG and its wholly owned subsidiary, petitioner Janus Capital Management LLC ("JCM"), made false statements in mutual funds prospectuses filed by Janus Investment Fund, for which JCM was the investment adviser and administrator, and that those statements affected the price of JCG's stock. Although JCG created Janus Investment Fund, it was a separate legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors. At issue was whether JCM, a mutual fund investment adviser, could be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its client mutual funds' prospectuses. The Court held that, because the false statements included in the prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM, JCM and JCG could not be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5. The Court found that, although JCM could have been significantly involved in preparing the prospectuses, it did not itself "make" the statements at issue for Rule 10b-5 purposes where its assistance in crafting what was said was subject to Janus Investment Fund's ultimate control. Accordingly, respondent had not stated a claim against JCM under Rule 10b-5 and the judgment of the Fourth Circuit was reversed.

Plaintiffs alleged that corporate officers committed securities fraud (15 U.S.C. 78j, 78t) by making false statements about about the corporation's financial health and controlled other persons regarding false statements by the corporation and other employees. The district court dismissed; the Sixth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed and the Sixth Circuit reversed. The complaint adequately alleged scienter by alleging that the defendants received internal reports and information showing financial distress, yet continually made false, positive statements regarding financial health. The court noted allegations concerning temporal proximity between false statements and corrective statements, defendants' financial motivations, the retirement of one defendant, and that the SEC investigated the company's accounting practices.

Plaintiffs appealed from judgments dismissing their class-action complaints seeking to hold defendants (collectively, "Rating Agencies") liable as underwriters or control persons for misstatements or omissions in securities offering documents in violation of sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(5), 77o(a). At issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" as defined by 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(11) because they helped structure securities transactions to achieve desired ratings. Also at issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "control persons" because of their alleged provision of advice and direction to primary violators regarding transaction structures under section 77o(a) of the 1933 Act. The court held that plaintiffs' section 11 claims that the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" was properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' alleged structuring or creation of securities was insufficient to demonstrate their involvement in the requisite distributional activities. The court also held that plaintiffs' "control person" claims under section 77o(a) were properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' provision of advice and guidance regarding transaction structures was insufficient to permit an inference that they had the power to direct the management or policies of alleged primary violators of section 11. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying implicitly plaintiffs' cursory requests for leave to amend.

In 2006, Respondent Cordillera Fund, LP, purchased shares in Appellant American Ethanol for $3 per share. In 2007, shareholders of American Ethanol sought to merge with AE Biofuels, and notified their shareholders of its intent. Respondent notified American Ethanol of its intent to dissent, and demanded payment for its shares. The merger was approved by the shareholders. When the merged company refused to pay, Respondent filed suit at the district court. Ultimately the issue for the district court to resolve involved the fair value of Respondentâs shares at the time of the merger. Appellants offered respondent $0.15 per share; Respondent maintained the fair value was $3 per share. The parties went to court because neither could agree on the value. The court entered a judgment in favor of Respondent, determining that $3 per share was the fair value. On appeal, Appellants contended that the district court abused its discretion in determining the fair value of the shares. The Supreme Court concluded that appellants did not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion, and affirmed the courtâs ruling in favor of Respondent.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

The company was established in 1998 to develop systems for high-speed Internet connections for home computers. After a decision to not respond to an acquisition offer, the company was in financial trouble by 2000 and took an $11 million loan for 90 days and a second loan for $9 million, on which it defaulted. The company exchanged its assets for stock in an amount that would have satisfied creditors and preferred stockholders. The stock, the company's only asset in bankruptcy, fell to a value less than the claims of creditors. Common shareholders brought suit. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the company's failure was not likely solely the result of the "burst of the dot-com bubble." Even if the directors were excused from liability for failure to exercise due care, as permitted by Delaware law, there was evidence of disloyalty, which was not excused. Evidence of disloyalty switched the burden of proving "entire fairness" with respect to the loans on the directors. There was enough evidence of causation and that certain preferred stockholders (venture capital groups) aided and abetted the directors to submit the question to a jury.