Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

A controller orchestrated a merger that consolidated Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart Corporation under Sears Holdings Corporation. The controller, through his investment funds, owned a majority of the new entity. In 2012, Sears Holdings spun off Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. (the Company) as a separate public entity, with the controller retaining a majority stake. In 2019, the Company merged with an acquisition subsidiary, with each share converted into the right to receive $3.21. Some stockholders sought appraisal, while others pursued a plenary action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware coordinated the appraisal proceeding and the plenary action for discovery and trial. The court certified a class in the plenary action, which was later modified to explicitly include stockholders who sought appraisal. During the appraisal proceeding, the Company and its post-merger parent became insolvent, rendering the appraisal claimants as general creditors with no prospect of recovery. The Fund, an appraisal claimant, opted to join the plenary action. The court found the merger was not entirely fair and determined a fair price of $4.06 per share, awarding incremental damages of $0.85 per share to the class members who had received the merger consideration.The Fund, having not received the merger consideration, sought to recover the full fair price damages award. The court held that under the precedent set by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Fund was entitled to the full fair price damages of $4.06 per share without any offset for the merger consideration it did not receive. The court concluded that the Fund could opt out of the appraisal proceeding and participate in the plenary action remedy, ensuring it was made whole. View "In re Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

A plaintiff purchased shares of a company that went public through a direct listing, which involved listing already-issued shares rather than issuing new ones. Following the listing, the company's stock price fell, and the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the registration statement was misleading, thus violating sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. These sections impose strict liability for any untrue statement or omission of a material fact in a registration statement or prospectus.The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, despite the plaintiff's concession that he could not trace his shares to the registration statement. The court held that it was sufficient for the plaintiff to allege that the shares were of the same nature as those issued under the registration statement. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed this decision.The United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that section 11 requires plaintiffs to show that the securities they purchased were traceable to the particular registration statement alleged to be false or misleading. On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that section 12(a)(2) also requires such traceability. Given the plaintiff's concession that he could not make the required showing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint in full and with prejudice. View "PIRANI V. SLACK TECHNOLOGIES" on Justia Law

Sophia Zhou and other investors filed a federal securities fraud class action against Desktop Metal, Inc. and several of its corporate officers after the company's stock price dropped in late 2021. The stock lost value following Desktop Metal's disclosure of an internal investigation that revealed corporate mismanagement and necessitated the recall of two key products. Zhou alleged that the defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes, including manufacturing Flexcera resin at non-FDA-registered facilities and marketing the PCA 4000 curing box for use with Flexcera without FDA certification.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Zhou's complaint for failure to state a claim. Zhou appealed, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her "scheme liability" claim and that she adequately stated a securities fraud claim based on material misrepresentations and omissions. The district court had found that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim and that her complaint failed to plead any materially false or misleading statement or omission.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Zhou did not preserve her scheme liability claim because she failed to adequately argue it in her opposition to the motion to dismiss or in her supplemental briefing. The court also determined that the district court correctly found that Zhou's complaint did not allege any materially false or misleading statements. Specifically, the court held that statements about Flexcera's FDA clearance, regulatory compliance, and product qualities were not rendered misleading by the alleged omissions. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Zhou's complaint. View "Zhou v. Desktop Metal, Inc." on Justia Law

TD Ameritrade offers brokerage services to retail investors, allowing them to trade stocks through its online platform. The company routes customer orders to trading venues for execution. Roderick Ford, representing a group of investors, alleged that TD Ameritrade's order-routing practices violated the company's duty of best execution by prioritizing venues that paid the company the most money rather than those providing the best outcomes for customers. Ford claimed this violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, and that CEO Frederic J. Tomczyk was jointly liable under § 20(a) of the Act.A magistrate judge initially recommended denying Ford's motion for class certification due to the predominance of individual questions of economic loss. However, the district court certified a class, believing Ford's expert's algorithm could address these issues. The Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, stating individual inquiries were still necessary. Ford then proposed a new class definition and moved again for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), (b)(2), and (c)(4). The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) and alternatively under Rule 23(b)(2) and (c)(4).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order for abuse of discretion. The court found that Ford's new theory of economic loss, based on commissions paid, did not align with the previous definition of economic loss and still required individualized inquiries. Consequently, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3). The court also found that the alternative certifications under Rule 23(b)(2) and (c)(4) were improper due to the predominance of individual issues and the lack of cohesiveness among class members. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over attorneys' fees following a $1 billion settlement in litigation challenging Dell Technologies' redemption of Class V stock. The plaintiff, Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan, alleged that Dell Technologies, controlled by Michael Dell and Silver Lake Group LLC, redeemed the Class V stock at an unfair price. The litigation was complex, involving extensive discovery and expert testimony, and was settled on the eve of trial.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware awarded 26.67% of the settlement, or $266.7 million, as attorneys' fees. Pentwater Capital Management LP and other class members objected, arguing that the fee was excessive and that a declining percentage method should be applied, similar to federal securities law cases. The Court of Chancery rejected this argument, holding that Delaware law, as established in Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, does not mandate a declining percentage approach. The court found that the $1 billion settlement was a significant achievement and that the fee award was justified based on the results achieved, the time and effort of counsel, and other relevant factors.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery did not exceed its discretion in awarding 26.67% of the settlement as attorneys' fees. The court emphasized that the Sugarland factors, particularly the results achieved, are paramount in determining fee awards. The Supreme Court also noted that while a declining percentage approach is permissible, it is not mandatory, and the Court of Chancery adequately justified its decision not to apply it in this case. View "In re Dell Technologies Inc." on Justia Law

Ryan Cox filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the defendants manipulated the price of a cryptocurrency called HEX by artificially lowering its ranking on CoinMarketCap.com. The defendants include two domestic companies, a foreign company, and three individual officers of the foreign company. Cox claimed that the manipulation caused HEX to trade at lower prices, benefiting the defendants financially.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Cox needed to show the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona before invoking the Commodity Exchange Act's nationwide service of process provision. The court found that none of the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes nationwide service of process independent of its venue requirement. The court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendants, CoinMarketCap and Binance.US, because they had sufficient contacts with the United States. The court also found that Cox's claims against these defendants were colorable under the Commodity Exchange Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the U.S. defendants and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the foreign defendants, Binance Capital and its officers, due to their lack of sufficient contacts with the United States. The court vacated the dismissal "with prejudice" and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against the foreign defendants without prejudice. View "COX V. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud class action against Atieva, Inc., d/b/a Lucid Motors, and its CEO, Peter Rawlinson. They alleged that Rawlinson made misrepresentations about Lucid's production capabilities, which affected the stock price of Churchill Capital Corp. IV (CCIV), a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) in which the plaintiffs were shareholders. These misrepresentations were made before Lucid was acquired by CCIV. Plaintiffs purchased CCIV stock based on these statements but did not own any Lucid stock, as Lucid was privately held at the time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially held that the plaintiffs had statutory standing but dismissed the action for failure to allege a material misrepresentation. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint, but ultimately denied the amendments as futile and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged materiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on an alternative ground. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, following the Birnbaum Rule, which limits standing to purchasers or sellers of the stock in question. The court agreed with the Second Circuit's precedent in Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd., holding that purchasers of a security of an acquiring company (CCIV) do not have standing to sue the target company (Lucid) for alleged misstatements made prior to the merger. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. View "MAX ROYAL LLC V. ATIEVA, INC." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Frequency Therapeutics, a biotech startup that was developing a treatment for severe sensorineural hearing loss called "FX-322". Initial trials were positive, but subsequent testing yielded disappointing results, causing a sharp drop in Frequency's stock price. Three stockholders filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. They claimed that Frequency's CEO, David Lucchino, and its Chief Development Officer, Carl LeBel, knew of problems with the study before the results were announced, yet gave investors assurances to the contrary.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a finding of scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants had made the false statements with the degree of scienter required to state a Securities and Exchange Act claim. The court noted that the complaint did not provide specific facts about when the defendants learned of the adverse events, which was a glaring omission. The court also found that the increase in stock sales by the CEO was not sufficient to establish an inference of scienter on its own. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations, taken collectively, did not give rise to a strong inference of scienter. View "Quinones v. Frequency Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Gerald Forsythe, who filed a class action lawsuit against Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. and several of its officers. Forsythe claimed that he and others who purchased or acquired Teva securities between October 29, 2015, and August 18, 2020, suffered damages due to misstatements and omissions by Teva and its officers related to Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. Teva's shares are dual listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.The District Court granted Forsythe's motion for class certification, rejecting Teva's assertion that the class definition should exclude purchasers of ordinary shares. The Court also rejected Teva's argument that Forsythe could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.Teva sought permission to appeal the District Court’s Order granting class certification, arguing that interlocutory review is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Teva contended that the Petition presents a novel legal issue and that the District Court erred in its predominance analysis with respect to Forsythe’s proposed class-wide damages methodology.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Teva's petition for permission to appeal. The court found that the securities issue did not directly relate to the requirements for class certification, and agreed with the District Court’s predominance analysis. The court also clarified that permission to appeal should be granted where the certification decision itself under Rule 23(a) and (b) turns on a novel or unsettled question of law, not simply where the merits of a particular case may turn on such a question. View "Forsythe v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd" on Justia Law

A class of stock purchasers alleged that Anadarko Petroleum Corporation fraudulently misrepresented the potential value of its Shenandoah oil field project in the Gulf of Mexico, violating federal securities law. The plaintiffs claimed that a decline in Anadarko’s stock price resulted from the company's disclosure that the Shenandoah project was dry and that Anadarko was taking a significant write-off for the project. The plaintiffs invoked the Basic presumption, a legal principle that allows courts to presume an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations if certain requirements are met.The District Court for the Southern District of Texas certified the class, relying on new evidence presented by the plaintiffs in their reply brief. Anadarko argued that it was not given a fair opportunity to respond to this new evidence and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Anadarko, stating that the district court should have allowed a sur-reply when the plaintiffs presented new evidence in their reply brief. The court held that when a party raises new arguments or evidence for the first time in a reply, the district court must either give the other party an opportunity to respond or decline to rely on the new arguments and evidence. The court also agreed that the district court failed to perform a full Daubert analysis, a standard for admitting expert scientific testimony. The court vacated the class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Georgia Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law