Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Chancery initially found that Wal-Mart stockholders who were attempting to prosecute derivative claims in Delaware could no longer do so because a federal court in Arkansas had reached a final judgment on the issue of demand futility first, and the stockholders were adequately represented in that action. But the derivative plaintiffs in Delaware asserted that applying issue preclusion in this context violated their Due Process rights. The Delaware Supreme Court surmised this dispute implicated complex questions regarding the relationship among competing derivative plaintiffs (and whether they may be said to be in “privity” with one another); whether failure to seek board-level company documents renders a derivative plaintiff’s representation inadequate; policies underlying issue preclusion; and Delaware courts’ obligation to respect the judgments of other jurisdictions. The Delaware Chancellor reiterated that, under the present state of the law, the subsequent plaintiffs’ Due Process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, the Chancellor suggested that the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a rule that a judgment in a derivative action could not bind a corporation or other stockholders until the suit has survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss The Chancellor reasoned that such a rule would better protect derivative plaintiffs’ Due Process rights, even when they were adequately represented in the first action. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt the Chancellor’s recommendation and instead, affirmed the Original Opinion granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss because, under the governing federal law, there was no Due Process violation. View "California State Teachers' Retirement System, et al. v. Alvarez, et al." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery initially found that Wal-Mart stockholders who were attempting to prosecute derivative claims in Delaware could no longer do so because a federal court in Arkansas had reached a final judgment on the issue of demand futility first, and the stockholders were adequately represented in that action. But the derivative plaintiffs in Delaware asserted that applying issue preclusion in this context violated their Due Process rights. The Delaware Supreme Court surmised this dispute implicated complex questions regarding the relationship among competing derivative plaintiffs (and whether they may be said to be in “privity” with one another); whether failure to seek board-level company documents renders a derivative plaintiff’s representation inadequate; policies underlying issue preclusion; and Delaware courts’ obligation to respect the judgments of other jurisdictions. The Delaware Chancellor reiterated that, under the present state of the law, the subsequent plaintiffs’ Due Process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, the Chancellor suggested that the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a rule that a judgment in a derivative action could not bind a corporation or other stockholders until the suit has survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss The Chancellor reasoned that such a rule would better protect derivative plaintiffs’ Due Process rights, even when they were adequately represented in the first action. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt the Chancellor’s recommendation and instead, affirmed the Original Opinion granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss because, under the governing federal law, there was no Due Process violation. View "California State Teachers' Retirement System, et al. v. Alvarez, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Austin Veith pleaded guilty to theft and securities fraud. He asked the trial court to sentence him to probation instead of a term of incarceration. The trial court rejected his request for probation with no incarceration and sentenced Veith to ten years of incarceration on the theft count, and twenty-five years of probation on the securities fraud count. Veith did not object when the judge announced his sentence.  But, he did not sign the probation order acknowledging and accepting the terms and conditions of his sentence of probation. Instead, he filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the probationary portion of his sentence must be vacated because he did not consent to it. The trial court denied the motion, and Veith appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that Veith had consented to the terms and conditions of the sentence of probation by requesting probation prior to the hearing, but that his consent did not include certain terms of probation added by the court. As a result, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to remove the terms of probation from his sentence that Veith had not requested before sentencing.I t did not order any modification of the prison sentence. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the legality of Veith’s sentence of probation, and reversed the appellate court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that a trial court cannot impose a sentence of probation without the defendant’s consent. In this case, Veith consented to probation in lieu of incarceration; therefore, the trial court exceeded the scope of Veith’s consent when it imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration in addition to probation. The trial court lacked authority to impose the sentence of probation.  Accordingly, the Court vacated Veith’s sentence in its entirety, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to that court to return the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Veith’s plea agreement. View "Veith v. Colorado" on Justia Law

After the SEC commenced an administrative proceeding conducted by an ALJ against appellants, appellants contend that the SEC's administrative proceeding is unconstitutional because the presiding ALJ's appointment violated Article II's Appointments Clause. Appellants filed suit in district court asserting their Appointments Clause claim and seeking an injunction against the ALJ's adjudication based on its alleged unconstitutionality. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that appellants' Appointments Clause challenge fell within the exclusive scope of the SEC's administrative review scheme and could reach a federal court only on petition for review of a final decision by the Commission. The court agreed and concluded that, by enacting the SEC's comprehensive scheme of administrative and judicial review, Congress implicitly precluded federal district court jurisdiction over appellants' constitutional challenge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tilton v. SEC" on Justia Law

The SEC brought an administrative proceeding against George Jarkesy, Jr., for securities fraud. Meanwhile, Jarkesy filed this suit seeking the administrative proceeding's termination, arguing that the proceeding’s initiation and conduct infringe his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress, by establishing a detailed statutory scheme providing for an administrative proceeding before the Commission plus the prospect of judicial review in a court of appeals, implicitly precluded concurrent district-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy’s. In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review forecloses parallel district-court jurisdiction. Applying the considerations outlined in Thunder Basin and its progeny, the court found that Congress intended exclusivity when it established the statutory scheme. Consequently, instead of obtaining judicial review of his challenges to the Commission’s administrative proceeding now, Jarkesy can secure judicial review in a court of appeals when (and if) the proceeding culminates in a resolution against him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jarkesy, Jr. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Bank and a group of States challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. The district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe. The court concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the Bureau. The court also concluded that the Bank has standing to challenge Director Cordray’s recess appointment, and that claim is ripe. Therefore, the court reversed as to that claim and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance the Bank’s constitutional challenge to the recess appointment. The court further concluded that the Bank lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and affirmed the judgment as to that claim. Finally, the court concluded that the State plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Government’s orderly liquidation authority, and that claim is not ripe. Therefore, the court affirmed as to that claim. View "State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, pension funds, filed suit, seeking to hold BNYM responsible for the losses allegedly caused by Countrywide's breach of its representations and warranties in connection with 530 residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) created between 2004 and 2008 for which BNYM acts as trustee. The court affirmed the portion of the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claims related to the trusts in which they did not invest for lack of standing because plaintiffs' claims do not implicate the "same set of concerns" as those of absent class members who purchased certificates issued by trusts in which no named plaintiff invested; reversed the portion of that order denying BNYM's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Trust Indenture Act (TIA), 15 U.S.C. 77aaa-77aaaa, claims related to the PSA-governed (pooling and servicing agreements) New York trusts where the New York certificates at issue are exempt from section 304(a)(2) of the TIA; and the court remanded in part for further proceedings. View "Retirement Board v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Dynegy filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Charles Silsby then filed a securities class action complaint against Dynegy and others alleging dissemination of false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts about Dynegy's financial performance and prospects, in violation of securities laws. Stephen Lucas was appointed lead plaintiff in Silsby v. Icahn, the securities class action litigation. In this appeal, Lucas challenged the district court's conclusion that he lacked standing to opt out of or object to the joint reorganization plan on behalf of the putative class in the securities litigation. The court concluded that Lucas' status as lead plaintiff of the putative class in the district court securities litigation did not automatically extend to the bankruptcy proceedings; because Lucas did not seek application of Rule 23 in bankruptcy court, he represented no one but himself; and since he opted out of the release in his individual capacity, Lucas lacks standing to appeal the order confirming the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Dynegy, Inc.," on Justia Law

This case arose out of the collapse of SIV, managed by Cheyne and structured by Morgan Stanley. PSERS and Commerzbank appealed from the final order of judgment denying class certification, dismissal of Commerzbank's claim for lack of standing; and dismissal of PSERS's claim because its presence as a party would destroy complete diversity, the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the denial of class certification and dismissal of PSERS; held that it was not a permissible exercise of discretion for the district court to limit Commerzbank's ability to establish its standing; certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that Commerzbank had acquired from a third party that had purchased securities a fraud claim against Morgan Stanley; and certified the question whether, if Commerzbank has standing, a reasonable trier of fact could hold Morgan Stanley liable for fraud based on the present record. View "Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement System v. Morgan Stanley" on Justia Law