Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Lead Plaintiff William Poppo filed a class action complaint on behalf of all persons who purchased Level 3 securities between October 2006 and October 2007. Plaintiff brought suit under the under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under state securities law. Plaintiff also asserted claims against individual defendants as "control persons" pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff appealed. "The fundamental weakness in plaintiff’s complaint is that he [gave the Tenth Circuit] a great volume of puzzle pieces that, despite [the Court's] best efforts, [the Court could not] fit together." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. View "In re: Level 3 Communication" on Justia Law

Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from convictions of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the SEC. The charges arose from an allegedly fraudulent reinsurance transaction between AIG and Gen Re that was intended to cure AIG's ailing stock price. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions were vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data. View "United States v. Ferguson, et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought a preliminary injunction against ClearOne Communications, Inc. based on suspicions of irregular accounting practices and securities law violations. During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, Defendant and former CEO Susie Strohm was asked if she was involved in a particular sale by ClearOne that was the focus of the SEC’s case. She said she was not and approximated that she learned of the sale either before or after the end of ClearOne’s fiscal year. Based on this testimony, Defendant was later convicted of one count of perjury. She argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that her conviction should be reversed because (1) the questioning at issue was ambiguous, (2) her testimony was literally true, and (3) even if false, her testimony was not material to the court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on all three points. The Court found the questions were not ambiguous and there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Defendant knowingly made false statements. Also, Defendant's testimony was material to the preliminary injunction hearing because it related to a transaction the SEC believed demonstrated ClearOne’s accounting irregularities. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Strohm" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant, James Gansman, appealed from a judgment convicting him of insider trading under the so-called "misappropriation theory." At issue was whether the district court erred in declining to adopt an instruction proposed by Gansman setting forth a theory of the defense based in part on SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2. The court held that Gansman was entitled to assert a defense theory that he did not have the requisite intent to commit securities fraud, and that in defining the nature of his relationship with Donna Murdoch, a woman with whom he was having an affair, to the jury, he had the right to use language found in Rule 10b5-2. The court held that, nevertheless, Gansman was not entitled to a new trial in the circumstances presented because the slightly modified instruction given by the district court was legally sufficient. Gansman raised a number of other challenges to his conviction, all of which were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gansman, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from appellant's participation in the Bayou Hedge Fund Group (Bayou), a classic Ponzi scheme masked as a group of domestic and offshore hedge funds. Appellant appealed from his sentencing, following a plea of guilty to misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4. At issue was whether the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $60 million was improper because it relied on events occurring outside the relevant time period and the putative victims' losses were neither directly nor proximately caused by his actions as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court found no error, much less plain error, in the district court's use of appellant's fraudulent 2003 faxes at sentencing. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that appellant's failure to report the Bayou fraud was both the direct and the proximate cause of the victim investors' losses. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Marino" on Justia Law

This criminal appeal arose from a "finite reinsurance" transaction between American International Group, Inc. (AIG) and General Reinsurance Corporation (Gen Re). Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from judgments convicting them of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. Most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions must be vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data and issued a jury instruction that directed the verdict on causation. View "United States v. Ferguson, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of securities fraud, alleged in the indictment to be a violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. 240.10(b)-5. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that defendant was not entitled to the protection of section 78ff(a) because he pled guilty to a statutory offense and the no-knowledge provision was inapplicable to people convicted of violating criminal securities law. The court, reading the plain language of the statute, held that the district court erred when it determined that defendant's guilty plea to a violation of section 78j(b) prevented him from asserting the no-knowledge defense. Thus, defendant was entitled to assert the no-knowledge defense to imprisonment at sentencing. The court held, however, that the district court did not reach the question of whether defendant had met his burden of showing no knowledge under Rule 10(b)-5 and as such, the issue was remanded to the district court for consideration. View "United States v. Behren" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. At issue, among other things, was whether venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York. The court held that venue in the Eastern District was proper for the conspiracy counts where defendant committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracies in the Eastern District. Accordingly, the court did not find venue for the conspiracy charges to be unfair or prejudicial. The court held, however, that venue in the Eastern District was improper for the substantive securities fraud count where no conduct that constituted the offense took place in the Eastern District. Accordingly, nothing in United States v. Svoboda called into question the principle that preparatory acts alone were insufficient to establish venue. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendant appealed from two judgments of conviction related to his involvement in "pump and dump" stock schemes. At issue was whether the first judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, should be overturned, either because the evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to find a fiduciary duty, or because the jury was improperly instructed about how to determine the existence of a fiduciary duty. Also at issue was whether the second judgment of conviction should be overturned because defendant's guilty plea, entered after his conviction in the first trial, was premised on the outcome of that trial. The court held that, upon reviewing the jury instructions for plain error and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the jury was entitled to find that the brokers in this case had a duty to disclose their exorbitant commissions, just as they had a duty to refrain from making affirmative misrepresentations regarding the size of their commissions, and thus, the district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of that duty. The court also held that, because it found no principled basis on which to distinguish this case from United States v. Szur, the court concluded that there was no error in the charge, and affirmed defendant's first conviction. Therefore, the court's conclusion necessarily defeated defendant's argument challenging his subsequent guilty plea and the second judgment of conviction was also affirmed.