Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

This insurance coverage dispute raised issues arising out of financial regulators' investigations in alleged accounting misstatements by MBIA, Inc. (MBIA) and related litigation. Based on these events, MBIA made claims under two $15 million director and officer (D&O) insurance policies it had purchased from Federal Insurance Co. (Federal) and ACE American Insurance Co. (ACE), seeking coverage for costs associated with these claims as losses under the policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MBIA on two of its three coverage claims but granted summary judgment in favor of Federal and ACE on one of MBIA's coverage claims. The parties subsequently appealed the district court's judgments. The court affirmed the district court with respect to coverage for all costs except those related to the independent consultant where the independent consultant's investigation was a covered cost under the policies. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of MBIA on its claim for coverage of the independent consultant's costs. View "MBIA Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (Enron) sought to avoid and recover payments it made to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity from appellees, whose notes were redeemed by Enron. On appeal, Enron challenged the district court's conclusion that 11 U.S.C. 546(e)'s safe harbor, which shielded "settlement payments" from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, protected Enron's redemption payments whether or not they were made to retire debt or were unusual. The court affirmed the district court's decision and order, holding that Enron's proposed exclusions from the reach of section 546(e) have no basis in the Bankruptcy Code where the payments at issue were made to redeem commercial paper, which the Bankruptcy Code defined as security. Therefore, the payments at issue constituted the "transfer of cash ... made to complete [a] securities transaction" and were settlement payments within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 741(8). The court declined to address Enron's arguments regarding legislative history because the court reached its conclusion based on the statute's plain language. View "In Re: Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., et al." on Justia Law

The SEC brought suit against senior officers of Gateway Incorporated ("Gateway") claiming that they unlawfully misrepresented Gateway's financial condition in the third quarter of 2000 in order to meet financial analysts' earnings and revenue expectations. After a three week trial, a jury found former Gateway financial executives, John J. Todd and Robert D. Manza, liable on all claims by the SEC. All parties appealed the district court's order in part. The court reversed the district court's order granting in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the antifraud claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., because substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that Todd and Manza at least recklessly misrepresented revenue related to the Lockheed transaction, and that Todd recklessly misrepresented revenue as to the VenServ transaction, in the third quarter of 2000. The court also reversed the district court's order granting Jeffrey Weitzen's, former Gateway President and CEO, motion for summary judgment as to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Weitzen knowingly misrepresented Gateway's financial growth as "accelerated" given his knowledge of the unusual Lockheed and AOL transactions. There were also issues of material fact as to whether Weitzen was a "control person" under Section 20(a). The court affirmed Weitzen's motion for summary judgment as to the Rule 13b2-2 claim because there was no evidence that Weitzen signed a letter to Gateway's auditors knowing that it misrepresented Gateway's financial position. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the aiding and abetting claims and their motions for a new trial.

Plaintiffs alleged that corporate officers committed securities fraud (15 U.S.C. 78j, 78t) by making false statements about about the corporation's financial health and controlled other persons regarding false statements by the corporation and other employees. The district court dismissed; the Sixth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed and the Sixth Circuit reversed. The complaint adequately alleged scienter by alleging that the defendants received internal reports and information showing financial distress, yet continually made false, positive statements regarding financial health. The court noted allegations concerning temporal proximity between false statements and corrective statements, defendants' financial motivations, the retirement of one defendant, and that the SEC investigated the company's accounting practices.

Plaintiffs appealed from judgments dismissing their class-action complaints seeking to hold defendants (collectively, "Rating Agencies") liable as underwriters or control persons for misstatements or omissions in securities offering documents in violation of sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(5), 77o(a). At issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" as defined by 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(11) because they helped structure securities transactions to achieve desired ratings. Also at issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "control persons" because of their alleged provision of advice and direction to primary violators regarding transaction structures under section 77o(a) of the 1933 Act. The court held that plaintiffs' section 11 claims that the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" was properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' alleged structuring or creation of securities was insufficient to demonstrate their involvement in the requisite distributional activities. The court also held that plaintiffs' "control person" claims under section 77o(a) were properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' provision of advice and guidance regarding transaction structures was insufficient to permit an inference that they had the power to direct the management or policies of alleged primary violators of section 11. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying implicitly plaintiffs' cursory requests for leave to amend.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.