Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of a securities class action against ZAGG, Inc. and its former CEO and Chairman, Robert Pedersen, alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The plaintiffs alleged Pedersen failed to disclose in several of ZAGG’s SEC filings the fact that he had pledged nearly half of his ZAGG shares (or approximately 9 percent of the company), as collateral in a margin account. The district court dismissed the complaint for a failure to plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference that Pedersen acted with an intent to defraud as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The Tenth Circuit found that the PSLRA subjected plaintiffs to a heightened pleading requirement of alleging intent to defraud with particularized facts that give rise to an inference that is at least as cogent as any competing, nonculpable explanations for a defendant’s conduct. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs did not meet that standard here. View "Swabb v. ZAGG, Inc." on Justia Law

Trinity, a New York Episcopal parish, owns Wal-Mart stock and requested that Wal-Mart include its shareholder proposal in Wal-Mart’s proxy materials. Trinity’s proposal, linked to Wal-Mart’s sale of high-capacity firearms at about one-third of its 3,000 stores, asked Board of Directors to develop and implement standards for use in deciding whether to sell a product that “especially endangers public safety,” “has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of Wal-Mart,” and/or “would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and community values integral to the Company’s promotion of its brand.” The Securities and Exchange Commission’s “ordinary business” exclusion lets a company omit a shareholder proposal from proxy materials if the proposal relates to ordinary business operations. Wal-Mart obtained a “no-action letter” from the SEC, indicating that there would be no recommendation of an enforcement action against Wal-Mart if it omitted the proposal from its proxy materials. Trinity filed suit. The district court held that, because the proposal concerned the company’s Board (rather than management) and focused principally on governance (rather than how Wal-Mart decides what to sell), it was outside ordinary business operations. The Third Circuit reversed. “Stripped to its essence, Trinity’s proposal goes to the heart of Wal-Mart’s business: what it sells on its shelves.” View "Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc" on Justia Law

Because a 1999 issue of cumulative preferred stock was impairing the company’s ability to raise capital, Emmis signed holders of 60% of the preferred shares to swaps. Emmis purchased shares; the owners delivered their shares to an escrow. Closing was deferred for five years, during which the sellers agreed to vote their shares as Emmis instructed. Emmis did this because, once it purchased any share outright, it would be retired and lose voting rights, Ind. Code 23-1-25-3(a). Emmis repurchased addition preferred stock in a tender offer and reissued it to a trust for bonuses to workers who stuck with the firm through the financial downturn. The trustee was to vote this stock at management’s direction. Senior managers and members of the board were excluded, leaving them free to propose and vote without a conflict of interest. The plans allowed Emmis to control more than 2/3 of the votes. Emmis then called on owners of common and preferred stock to vote on whether the terms of the preferred stock should be changed. The cumulative feature of the stock’s dividends and other rights were eliminated. Plaintiffs, who own remaining preferred stock, sued. The district court rejected claims under federal and Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana, apparently alone among the states, allows a corporation to vote its own shares, which may be good, or may be bad, but the ability to negotiate better terms, or invest elsewhere, rather than judicially imposed “best practices,” is how corporate law protects investors View "Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Between 2004 and 2009, Stryker submitted information to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Division regarding alleged wrongdoing by ATG and an involved individual. In 2009, the SEC opened an investigation and interviewed Stryker. The SEC subsequently filed an enforcement action against ATG and the individual, charging them with violating Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. In 2010, the SEC reached a settlement with the respondents to the enforcement action. The district court approved the settlement, whereby ATG and the individual were held liable for more than $19 million. In 2011, Stryker sought a whistleblower award under Section 21F of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6, based on the successful enforcement action. The SEC denied the award because the information was submitted before enactment of Dodd-Frank. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the SEC’s interpretation was within its authority and consistent with the legislation. View "Stryker v. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Shareholders are required to make a “demand” on the corporation’s board of directors before filing a derivative suit, unless they sufficiently allege that demand would be futile. Before Arduini filed his derivative action against IGT and its board, four shareholders filed derivative suits that were consolidated. They argued that a demand was excused because: the IGT board extended the employment contract of IGT’s former CEO and chairman of IGT’s board of directors, and allowed him to resign rather than terminating him for cause; three directors received such high compensation from IGT that their ability to impartially consider a demand was compromised; six directors faced a substantial likelihood of liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties as committee members; and that other members had engaged in insider trading. The district court dismissed the consolidated suit for failure to make a demand or sufficiently allege futility; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The district court then dismissed Arduini’s action, holding that Arduini had failed to make a demand and could not allege demand futility based on issue preclusion due to its ruling in the prior suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that under Nevada law and these facts, issue preclusion barred relitigation of futility. View "Arduini v. Int'l Gaming Tech." on Justia Law

Allergan, the pharmaceutical manufacturer of Botox, settled several qui tam suits concerning allegations that it had acted illegally in marketing and labeling Botox, and pled guilty in a criminal case. Plaintiffs, all Allergan shareholders, subsequently filed a derivative action alleging that Allergan's directors are liable for violations of various state and federal laws, as well as breaches of their fiduciary duties to Allergan. Plaintiffs failed to make a demand on Allergan's board requesting that Allergan bring the derivative claims in its own name. The court concluded that the district court misapplied governing Delaware law and improperly drew inferences against plaintiffs rather than in their favor when the district court dismissed the action on the ground that plaintiffs failed to allege particularized facts showing that demand was excused under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. The court concluded that demand was excused where plaintiffs' particularized allegations established a reasonable doubt as to whether the Board faces a substantial likelihood of liability and as to whether the Board is protected by the business judgment rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosenbloom v. Pyott" on Justia Law

Lukas owns stock in Miller, a publicly owned corporation engaged in production of oil and natural gas. In 2009, Miller announced that it had acquired the “Alaska assets,” worth $325 million for only $2.25 million. Miller announced several increases in the value of the Alaska assets over the following months, causing increases in its stock price. In 2010, Miller amended its employment agreement with its CEO (Boruff), substantially increasing his compensation and giving him stock options. The Compensation Committee (McPeak, Stivers, and Gettelfinger) recommended the amendment and the Board, composed of those four and five others, approved it. In 2011 a website published a report claiming that the Alaska assets were worth only $25 to $30 million and offset by $40 million in liabilities. In SEC filings, Miller acknowledged “errors in . . . financial statements” and “computational errors.” The stock price decreased., Lukas filed suit against Miller and its Board members, alleging: breach of fiduciary duty and disseminating materially false and misleading information; breach of fiduciary duties for failing to properly manage the company; unjust enrichment; abuse of control; gross mismanagement; and waste of corporate assets. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Lukas brought suit without first making a demand on the Miller Board of Directors to pursue this action, as required by Tennessee law, and did not establish futility.View "Lukas v. McPeak" on Justia Law

The Funds, closed-end investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a- 5(a)(1)(2), are organized as Massachusetts business trusts under G.L. c. 182. Plaintiffs are beneficial owners of preferred shares of each of the Funds. The Funds’ declarations of trust state that meetings shall be held “so long as Common Shares are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, on at least an annual basis." After plaintiffs delivered written notice stating an intention to nominate one of their partners for election as a preferred shares trustee of each fund at the 2011 annual meeting, the Funds issued a press release stating that their annual meeting was being rescheduled to July 2012, the last day of the Funds' 2012 fiscal year. Plaintiffs claimed that the bylaws require that an annual shareholders’ meeting be held within 12 months of the last annual shareholder meeting. The Funds argued that the bylaws require only that one meeting be held each fiscal year. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that "on at least an annual basis" means that a shareholders' meeting for each Fund must be held no later than one year and 30 days after the last annual meeting. View "Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund, Ltd. v. PIMCO, Income Strategy Fund" on Justia Law

Greenblatt, the “bad boy of Chicago arbitrage” became involved in litigation concerning use of his “web of corporations,” including Loop Corporation and Banco. In 2000, Banco extended a $9.9 million line of credit in exchange for a blanket lien over Loop’s assets. Loop defaulted; nevertheless, Banco expanded the line of credit by several million dollars in 2002 and continued lending Loop money until 2004. Banco lost senior creditor status when the district court voided the lien in an earlier case. In 2001 Loop purchased millions of shares of EZ Links stock from Golf Venture, giving a promissory note. Loop defaulted; Golf Venture won a judgment of $1.2 million. Also in 2001, a failed margin transaction left Loop indebted to its brokerage firm, Wachovia, in the amount of $1,885,751. Wachovia took Loop to arbitration and won a $2,349,000 award in 2005. Wachovia is still trying to collect. Loop had transferred almost all of its valuable assets to another Greenblatt company, leaving only the EZ Links stock, in possession of Banco, and Banco claimed to have creditor priority over Wachovia. The district vourt pierced Loop’s corporate veil, allowing Wachovia to reach Greenblatt’s assets, and voiding Banco’s lien, and ordered the sale of Loop’s only asset, EZ Links stock. Banco attempted to contest the d decisions. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Banco’s appeal for lack of standing.View "Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an interlocutory appeal by the Court of Chancery of a preliminary injunction halting consummation of a stock purchase agreement under which Vivendi, S.A. would have divested itself of its controlling interest in Appellee Activision Blizzard, Inc., and an Activision stockholder. Appellees convinced the trial court that the company’s charter required that a majority of the public stockholders vote in favor of the transaction. The relevant provision applied to "any merger, business combination, or similar transaction" involving Vivendi and Activision. The trial court held that Activision's purchase of its own stock would be a business combination because significant value would be transferred to Vivendi in exchange for Activision's acquisition of a newly-formed Vivendi subsidiary that held Vivendi's Activision stock. In October 2013, the Supreme Court reversed, and this opinion set forth the basis for its decision. View "Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al. v. Hayes, et al." on Justia Law