Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants are MB, a registered investment adviser, and people affiliated with MB. A fraudulent scheme was perpetrated by Bloom while he was an employee and officer of MB, through a hedge fund called North Hills that Bloom controlled and managed outside the scope of his responsibilities at MB. Bloom was arrested and indicted in New York in 2009 on charges relating to the Ponzi scheme, by which time most of the money invested in North Hills was gone. Investors filed suit, alleging: controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act; negligent supervision; violations of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5; violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law; and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with respect to MB on the claims for violations of Rule 10b-5 and the state UTPCPL, and otherwise affirmed. View "Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action under sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act, alleging that a prospectus and registration statement (the offering documents) issued by AMAG Pharmaceutical, Inc. in connection with a secondary stock offering held in 2010 contained two serious omissions: (1) a failure to disclose almost two dozen reports of serious adverse effects linked to a make-or-break drug for AMAG's future; and (2) failure to disclose information the FDA revealed in a warning letter issued after the offering. The district court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs failed sufficiently to plead section 11 claims pursuant to an SEC regulation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the dismissal of the claims of actionable omissions because of the undisclosed reports because the reports gave rise to uncertainties AMAG knew would adversely affect future revenues and risk factors that made the offering risky and speculative; (2) affirmed as to the claims of omissions regarding the FDA information; and (3) reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' sections 12 and 15 causes of action. Remanded. View "Silverstrand Invs. v. Amag Pharms., Inc." on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan filed an action seeking to enjoin arbitration proceedings on the ground that under the controlling FINRA Rule, defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan entitled to compel arbitration of their dispute. In their FINRA arbitration claim, defendants asserted that Morgan Keegan engaged in misconduct relating to the valuation and marketing of certain bond funds purchased by defendants through their brokerage firm. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in holding that Morgan Keegan was not subject to FINRA arbitration. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because defendants were not "customers" of Morgan Keegan, within the meaning of the disputed FINRA Rule 12200, and, therefore, were not entitled to invoke the mandatory arbitration provision contained in that rule. View "Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2)(A), by issuing a misleading press release concerning the results of a clinical trial for a drug called bapineuzumab. Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) and denying leave to amend. The court concluded that, in the context of the full presentation of the details surrounding the study of the drug, nothing omitted from the press release rendered it false or misleading to a reasonable investor. Moreover, the court held that plaintiff offered insufficient additional allegations to cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kleinman v. Elan Corp., PLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors in Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674 et seq., action against the SEC and the Government. On appeal, the court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction within the "discretionary function" exception to the United State's waiver of sovereign immunity in section 2680(a) of the FTCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and adopted parts of the district court's opinion as its own. The court also held that the additional allegations made in the Second Amended Complaint were insufficient to overcome the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for additional discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dichter-Mad Family Partners, et al v. USA" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a viable section 16(b) disgorgement claim pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b). At issue was whether the "short-swing profit rule" applied when a corporate insider sold shares of one type of stock issued by the insider's company and purchased shares of a different type of stock in that same company. The court held, absent any guidelines from the SEC, that section 16(b) did not apply to transactions of this sort involving separately traded, nonconvertible stocks with different voting rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gibbons v. Malone" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased variable universal life insurance policies from defendant. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action suit against defendant under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1), for levying excessive cost of insurance charges. The court concluded that claims of breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing were not precluded by SLUSA, even if such claims related to the purchase or sale of a covered security. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the two contract claims, on the condition that plaintiffs amend their complaint to remove any reference to deliberate concealment or fraudulent omission. The court affirmed the dismissal of the class claim for unfair competition in violation of California law. View "Freeman Investments, L.P., et al v. Pacific Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the shares they purchased in Century Aluminum Company were issued under a materially false and misleading prospectus supplement which was treated as part of the company's registration statement for purposes of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k. The court concluded that plaintiffs' failure to plead the traceability of their shares meant that they lacked statutory standing under section 11, but failure to allege statutory standing resulted in failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, not the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court should therefore have addressed the company's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1). Notwithstanding this error, the court affirmed the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Petzschke, et al v. Century Aluminum Co., et al" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law