Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

As part of a civil enforcement action brought by the SEC, the district court entered a disgorgement order against Peter S. Cahill, imposing joint and several liability for the full proceeds of his sales of stock in a small, thinly traded corporation not listed on a major stock exchange. Cahill challenged the order. The court held that because Cahill presented no evidence in rebuttal, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the SEC had met its burden to show that his ill-gotten gains were the full proceeds of his stock sales at inflated prices resulting from a fraudulent "pump and dump" scheme. Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in crafting the disgorgement remedy. Inclusion of the transferred funds was consistent with the court's precedent. Absent any rationale for a different approach, the court joined other circuits in holding that the imposition of joint and several liability for the amount ordered to be disgorged did not require proof of a close relationship among the defendants beyond their collaboration in the fraudulent scheme in violation of the securities laws. Accordingly, because Cahill's evidentiary objections were also unavailing, the court affirmed the order of disgorgement. View "Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Whittemore, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a decision granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs, participants in two retirement plans offered by defendants, brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that defendants acted imprudently by including employer stock as an investment option in the retirement plans and that defendants failed to provide adequate and truthful information to participants regarding the status of employer stock. The court held that the facts alleged by plaintiffs were, even if proven, insufficient to establish that defendants abused their discretion by continuing to offer plan participants the opportunity to invest in McGraw-Hill stock. The court also held that plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to prove that defendants made any statements, while acting in a fiduciary capacity, that they knew to be false. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Gearren, et al. v. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, participants in retirement plans offered by defendants and covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., appealed from a judgment dismissing their ERISA class action complaint. Plan documents required that a stock fund consisting primarily of Citigroup common stock be offered among the plan's investment options. Plaintiffs argued that because Citigroup stock became an imprudent investment, defendants should have limited plan participants' ability to invest in it. The court held that plan fiduciaries' decision to continue offering participants the opportunity to invest in Citigroup stock should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion and the court found that they did not abuse their discretion here. The court also held that defendants did not have an affirmative duty to disclose to plan participants nonpublic information regarding the expected performance of Citigroup stock and that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that defendants, in their fiduciary capacities, made any knowing misstatements regarding Citigroup stock. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gray, et al. v. Citigroup, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The SEC commenced this civil enforcement action against appellant, a registered investment adviser (Jamerica), and a private investment (Brawta)(collectively, defendants), alleging that their fraudulent misrepresentations and diversion of Brawta funds violated securities laws. Initially, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, froze defendants' assets, and ordered Brawta to undertake and submit a sworn independent accounting. Then the district court granted the SEC summary judgment, permanently enjoining appellant and Jamerica from future violations of securities laws, and ordering them, jointly and severally, to disgorge misappropriated investor funds. The court held that, having reviewed the record de novo, summary judgment was appropriate for the reasons stated by the district court and that appellant's other challenges to the court's orders were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "SEC v. Brown, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses. View "United States v. Siddon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a dismissal of their complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) lacked the authority to bring court actions to collect disciplinary fines as imposed. The court held that the heavy weight of evidence suggested that Congress did not intend to empower FINRA to bring court proceedings to enforce its fines and that the 1990 Rule Change did not authorize FINRA to judicially enforce the collection of its disciplinary fines. View "John J. Fiero and Fiero Brothers, Inc. v. FINRA" on Justia Law

UBS appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from proceeding with an arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and alternatively requiring that the arbitration proceed in New York County. In the arbitration, defendants sought damages for UBS's alleged fraud in connection with defendants' issuances of auction rate securities. The court held that defendants were entitled to arbitration because they became UBS's "customer" under FINRA's rules when they undertook to purchase auction services from UBS. The court also held that the enforceability of the forum selection clause was a procedural issue for FINRA arbitrators to address and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resolve it. View "UBS Financial Servs, Inc. v. West Virginia University Hosp." on Justia Law

In this securities fraud class action, the investor plaintiffs sued the defendant company and three of its principal officers, alleging that they had made a series of eleven false or misleading statements to the public, in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. Plaintiffs claimed that the false statements had the effect of artificially inflating the price of defendant's stock until the truth belatedly came out, at which time the stock price dropped and plaintiffs suffered substantial financial losses. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from the alleged misstatements made on March 5, 2004 and July 26, 2004, because plaintiffs have inadequately pled scienter and falsity. However, as for plaintiffs' claims arising out of defendant's February 23, 2005 and March 16, 2005 statements, the court vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment. The court held that the securities laws prohibited corporate representatives from knowingly peddling material misrepresentations to the public, regardless of whether the statements introduced a new falsehood to the market or merely confirmed misinformation already in the marketplace. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Findwhat Investor Group, et al. v. Findwhat.com, et al." on Justia Law

In this civil enforcement action, a jury found that appellant aided and abetted a securities fraud by his former employer, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78t(e). The district court fined appellant and barred him from serving as an officer or director of a publicly held company for five years. On appeal, appellant argued that the district court erred in allowing his trial to proceed in the District of Columbia pursuant to the "co-conspirator theory of venue." The court held that the SEC failed to lay venue in the District of Columbia under the straightforward language of 15 U.S.C. 78aa. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the district court was instructed to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Johnson, Jr., et al." on Justia Law