Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

The Lindsays were minority shareholders of the 304 Corporation; its principal asset was Mid City Bank. In 2010, the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance and the FDIC began an examination of the bank. In 2011, the Department appointed the FDIC as the bank's receiver, stating that “‘large commercial real estate loan and poor management practices . . . led to a deterioration of the bank’s capital’” so that there was “‘no option but to declare the insolvent institution receivership.’” The bank reopened and regained good standing. In 2014, the FDIC filed suit, alleging that Fitl “was grossly negligent and breached his fiduciary duties,” 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). The Lindsays also filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The court dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The Lindsays’ claims are similar to all other shareholders’ claims and did not arise from a special duty, since the injury was not “separate and distinct.” The district court correctly concluded that the Lindsays’ claims were derivative in nature and that as a result of the FDIC lawsuit, the Lindsays had no standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. View "Lindsay v. Fitl" on Justia Law

Acting on “obviously nonpublic information” that a golfing buddy, McPhail, received from a corporate insider, Parigian made more than $200,000 trading in securities. A federal criminal securities fraud indictment alleged a “misappropriation theory” against Parigian, arguing that Parigian knew or should have known that, by providing the inside information to Parigian, McPhail breached a duty of trust and confidence and personally benefited by doing so. He pled guilty to the charges conditionally. The First Circuit rejected Parigian's preserved challenges to the indictment, following the circuit’s controlling precedent: allegations of a friendship between McPhail and Parigian plus an expectation that the tippees would treat McPhail to a golf outing and assorted luxury entertainment is enough to allege a benefit if a benefit is required. The court rejected an argument that the government was obligated to allege that the insider was also expecting a benefit when passing along confidential information to McPhail in the first instance. View "United States v. Parigian" on Justia Law

The SEC waited more than five years to commence an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and disgorgement against defendants, who allegedly violated federal securities law by selling unregistered securities. Defendants raised the five-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in their motions for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. 2462. Section 2462, with few exceptions, bars the government from bringing suit to enforce “any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture” after five years from when the claim first accrued. The court concluded that the SEC is time-barred from proceeding with its claims for declaratory relief and disgorgement because, under the plain meaning of section 2462, these remedies are a penalty and a forfeiture, respectively. But, because an injunction is not a penalty under section 2462, the court remanded for further proceedings on that remedy. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "SEC v. Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retiree with significant trading experience, received $500,000 following her husband’s death. After consulting with Jennifer Huang, her long-time commodity trading advisor, and James Kelly, an account executive at her futures commission merchant (FCM), Peregrine, plaintiff decided to place the funds in a new account with Peregrine. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit claiming that Kelly and Peregrine disregarded her account instructions and permitted Huang to conduct unauthorized trades in the account, in violation of 7 U.S.C. 6b(a) and 17 C.F.R. 166.2–166.3. The ALJ ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the CFTC reversed. Applying a substantial evidence standard, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the CFTC’s decision that Kelly made no material misrepresentation or omission, that there was no unauthorized trading, and that the record does not support a finding of fraud. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chenli Chu v. US Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were all affiliates of Arthur and Angela Williams, who owned stock in Citigroup. The defendants were Citigroup and eight of its officers and directors. In 1998, Citicorp and Travelers Group, Inc. merged, forming Citigroup. At that point, Arthur Williams's shares in Travelers Group were converted into 17.6 million shares of Citigroup common stock, which were valued at the time of the merger at $35 per share. In 2007, the Williamses had these shares transferred into AHW Investment Partnership, MFS Inc., and seven grantor-retained annuity trusts, all of which the Williamses controlled. In 2007, the Williamses sold one million shares at $55 per share. But, the Williamses halted their plan to sell all of their Citigroup stock because, based on Citigroup's filings and financial statements, they concluded that there was little downside to retaining their remaining 16.6 million shares. The Williamses allegedly held those shares for the next twenty-two months, finally selling them in March 2009 for $3.09 per share. After selling their 16.6 million shares, the Williamses sued Citigroup in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that their decision not to sell all of their shares in May 2007, and their similar decisions to hold on at least three later dates, were due to Citigroup‘s failure to disclose accurate information about its true financial condition from 2007 to 2009. The Second Circuit certified a question of Delaware law to the Delaware Supreme Court arising from an appeal of a New York District Court decision. The Second Circuit asked whether the claims of a plaintiff against a corporate defendant alleging damages based on the plaintiff‘s continuing to hold the corporation's stock in reliance on the defendant's misstatements as the stock diminished in value properly brought as direct or derivative claims. The Delaware Court answered: the holder claims in this action were direct. "This is because under the laws governing those claims [(]those of either New York or Florida[)] the claims belong to the stockholder who allegedly relied on the corporation's misstatements to her detriment. Under those state laws, the holder claims are not derivative because they are personal to the stockholder and do not belong to the corporation itself." View "Citigroup Inc., et al. v. AHW Investment Partnership, MFS, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In October 2012, and again a year later, General Cable announced that it would reissue several public financial statements because they included material accounting errors. Soon after, City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System initiated a class-action suit against General Cable, under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Livonia asserted that defendants acted at least recklessly in issuing or approving materially false public financial statements. The defendants countered that the misstatements resulted from accounting errors and a theft scheme in its Brazilian operations of which the defendants were unaware and that they promptly sought to remediate upon discovering them. The district court dismissed Livonia’s complaint with prejudice because it failed to plead scienter adequately. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Seven factors favored rejecting a scienter inference. Livonia cited no facts with sufficient particularity implicating suspicious insider trading or failure to disclose impending stock sales. View "Doshi v. General Cable Corp." on Justia Law

The FDIC filed suit under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., as receiver for Colonial. The complaint was timely under the terms of the FDIC Extender Statute, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(14)(A), because it was filed less than three years after the FDIC was appointed receiver. However, because the complaint was filed more than three years after the securities at issue were offered to the public, it would be untimely under the terms of the Securities Act’s statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. 77m.  In Federal Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., the court held that a materially identical extender statute for actions brought by the FHFA did displace the Securities Act’s statute of repose. The court concluded that UBS remains good law and that, under UBS, the FDIC's complaint was timely. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "FDIC v. First Horizon Asset Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

When the five investment funds at issue lost nearly 90 percent of their value in 2007-2008, investors lost large sums. Various plaintiffs (investors) initially filed claims with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, participated in arbitration, or filed state suits. In 2013, they filed suit under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k, 77l, and 77o, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and SEC Rule 10b-5. They alleged that the funds were overvalued and concentrated in risky securities and that investors relied on misrepresentations in purchasing the funds. The district court initially granted class certification, but dismissed the claims as barred by the statutes of limitations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the suits were barred by the applicable statutes of repose. The court declined to “toll” those statutes View "Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors, filed suit contending that defendants sold securities representing shares in SaiNaith L.L.C. based on false statements that a hotel was owned by that company. The court focused on one of plaintiffs’ theories under Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:712(A)(2) and 51:714, which allows purchasers of securities to recover their investment from the seller of the securities, who made the sale based on false representations. The court agreed with the district court that the summary judgment evidence establishes that SaiNaith never owned the hotel and the investors received interests in a shell company and defendants violated Louisiana law by representing otherwise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendants personally under the Louisiana statutes. View "Meadaa v. Karsan" on Justia Law

Manning held 2,000,000 shares of Escala stock. He claims that he lost most of his investment when its price plummeted after Merrill Lynch devalued Escala through “naked short sales.” Unlike a typical short sale, where a person borrows stock from a broker, sells it to a buyer on the open market, and later purchases the same number of shares to return to the broker, the seller in a “naked” short sale does not borrow the stock he puts on the market, and never delivers the promised shares to the buyer. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation SHO prohibits short-sellers from intentionally failing to deliver securities. Manning claimed violation of New Jersey law, but referred explicitly to Regulation SHO, citing past accusations against Merrill Lynch and suggesting that the transactions at issue had again violated the regulation. Merrill Lynch removed the case, invoking general federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. 1331, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78aa(a). The Third Circuit ordered remand, holding that Manning’s claims did not necessarily raise any federal issues and that the Exchange Act covers only cases that would satisfy the “arising under” test for general federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed. The jurisdictional test established by Section 27 is the same as Section 1331’s test for deciding if a case “arises under” a federal law. Section 27 confers federal jurisdiction over suits brought under the Exchange Act and the rare suit in which a state-law claim rises and falls on the plaintiff’s ability to prove the violation of a federal duty. View "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning" on Justia Law