Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Toy Box, an LLC organized to operate storage facility sales businesses, distributed an Offering Circular that stated that investors’ funds would be held in escrow and not released unless a minimum of $500,000 in capital was deposited in 2008. If Toy Box did not raise minimum capital by the deadline, the offering would terminate and Toy Box would return investors' funds . Doud executed a subscription agreement and invested $100,000. In June 2008, Toy Box amended its offering, lowering the minimum capital requirement to $350,000. Doud agreed to the amendment. By July 11, 2008, Toy Box had raised $200,000, including Doud’s investment; a manager authorized release of the escrow funds. Days later, Toy Box represented to investors that it had "achieved its threshold funding level and exited escrow with $425,000 in place." In 2011, Toy Box suffered substantial financial losses. Doud lost his investment and sued, alleging breach of the investment agreement and violation of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)); SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b-9; and the Iowa Uniform Securities Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that Toy Box had breached its agreement by releasing escrow funds before reaching the minimum threshold of funding; that its conduct violated both SEC Rules and the Uniform Securities Act; that Doud had established scienter; and rejecting a claim of good faith. View "Doud v. Toy Box Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a mutual fund, challenged the Commission's denial of an exemption from rules governing the calculation and reporting of petitioner's deferred tax liability. The court concluded that petitioner’s attacks on the Commission’s “hypothetical speculation” affords no basis for setting aside the Commission’s reasonable conclusion that petitioner’s proposal to provide for only a small fraction of its full potential tax liability may result in inequitable treatment of redeeming and non-redeeming shareholders, contradicting a primary purpose of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(a). The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims. Accordingly, petitioner's arguments fail to carry the high burden required to overturn the Commission’s denial of an exemption and, therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Copley Fund, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

The FDIC filed suit against defendants for securities fraud, alleging that they made false and misleading statements in selling and underwriting residential mortgage backed securities. The FDIC filed its lawsuit within three years of its appointment as receiver, and therefore within the federal limitations period in the FDIC Extender Statute, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(14), but it filed suit more than five years after the securities at issue were sold, running afoul of the limitations period under state law. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants, holding that the FDIC Extender Statute preempts only state statutes of limitations, not state statutes of repose. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the FDIC Extender Statute preempts all limitations periods, whether characterized as statutes of limitations or as statutes of repose. View "FDIC v. RBS Securities Inc." on Justia Law

After the merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica, shareholders filed class actions alleging violations of securities laws. The district court appointed Oetting as lead plaintiff and the Green law firm, as lead counsel. The litigation resulted in a $333 million settlement for the NationsBank class. The Eighth Circuit affirmed approval of the settlement over Oetting’s objection. On the recommendation of Green, the court appointed Heffler as claims administrator. A Heffler employee conspired to submit false claims, resulting in fraudulent payment of $5.87 million. The court denied Green leave to file a supplemental complaint against Heffler. Oetting filed a separate action against Heffler that is pending. After distributions, $2.4 million remained. Green moved for distribution cy pres and requested an additional award of $98,114.34 in attorney’s fees for post-settlement work. Oetting opposed both, argued that Green should disgorge fees for abandoning the class, and filed a separate class action, alleging malpractice by negligently hiring and failing to supervise Heffler and abandonment of the class. The court granted Green’s motion for a cy pres distribution and for a supplemental fee award and denied disgorgement. The Eighth Circuit reversed the cy pres award, ordering additional distribution to the class, and vacated the supplemental fee award as premature. The district court then dismissed the malpractice complaint, concluding that Oetting lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that collateral estoppel precluded the rejected disgorgement and class-abandonment claims; pendency of an appeal did not suspend preclusive effects. View "Oetting v. Norton" on Justia Law

After the merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica, shareholders filed class actions alleging violations of securities laws. The district court appointed Oetting as lead plaintiff and the Green law firm, as lead counsel. The litigation resulted in a $333 million settlement for the NationsBank class. The Eighth Circuit affirmed approval of the settlement over Oetting’s objection. On the recommendation of Green, the court appointed Heffler as claims administrator. A Heffler employee conspired to submit false claims, resulting in fraudulent payment of $5.87 million. The court denied Green leave to file a supplemental complaint against Heffler. Oetting filed a separate action against Heffler that is pending. After distributions, $2.4 million remained. Green moved for distribution cy pres and requested an additional award of $98,114.34 in attorney’s fees for post-settlement work. Oetting opposed both, argued that Green should disgorge fees for abandoning the class, and filed a separate class action, alleging malpractice by negligently hiring and failing to supervise Heffler and abandonment of the class. The court granted Green’s motion for a cy pres distribution and for a supplemental fee award and denied disgorgement. The Eighth Circuit reversed the cy pres award, ordering additional distribution to the class, and vacated the supplemental fee award as premature. The district court then dismissed the malpractice complaint, concluding that Oetting lacked standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that collateral estoppel precluded the rejected disgorgement and class-abandonment claims; pendency of an appeal did not suspend preclusive effects. View "Oetting v. Norton" on Justia Law

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sued Arrington, Kratville, Welke, Elite Holdings, and MJM, alleging that they fraudulently induced more than 130 individuals to invest $4.7 million in commodity pools, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1. The district court granted summary judgment against Kratville. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his request for more time to review purportedly new evidence; consideration affidavits from investors who signed releases and from investors who allegedly lacked credibility; refusal to consider the affidavit of an expert opining on the authenticity of emails; summary judgment on the CFTC's claim that Kratville committed fraud and related violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations in soliciting persons to invest and maintain funds in commodity investment pools; and a determination that the litigation strategy of Kratville's attorney was not excusable neglect warranting relief under FRCP 60(b)(1). Kratville's misrepresentations and omissions related to potential profit and risk, the identities of brokers, and ownership of a proprietary trading system were material. He hid from investors that pool funds were being sent out of the country and that the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance had ordered Elite Pools to be closed and participants’ funds to be returned. View "Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kratville" on Justia Law

Based on their involvement in promoting or selling stock for Petro America, an unregistered company that had no value, eight coconspirators were charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 371. Hawkins was also charged with aiding and abetting securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 77q and 18 U.S.C. 2, aggravated currency structuring, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3) and (d)(2), money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, and two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Brown was also charged with securities fraud and wire fraud; Heurung was charged with two additional counts of wire fraud; and Miller was charged with money laundering and wire fraud. The others pled guilty to various charges. Hawkins, Brown, Heurung, Miller and Roper proceeded to trial. Hawkins argued that Petro America was a legitimate company and that the government was prosecuting so that it could confiscate the company's substantial assets. The others acknowledged that Petro America was a sham but claimed they had believed in good faith that the company was real and that they could promote or sell its stock. The Eighth Circuit affirmed their convictions on all counts, rejecting challenges concerning jury selection and evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Just before investing in Zhongpin on behalf of Prestige, Yang, a Chinese citizen employed at a U.S. investment firm, purchased Zhongpin shares and option contracts for himself. Yang was Prestige’s only officer and employee and sole investment manager. Yang did not disclose the purchases to Prestige. After its purchases, Prestige owned more than five percent of Zhongpin’s common stock, triggering an obligation to file Schedule 13D, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d). Yang and two others associated with Prestige filed Schedule 13D on behalf of Prestige, disclosing that Yang shared voting and dispositive power over Prestige’s Zhongpin shares, but failing to list the shares that Yang had purchased for himself, as required. The Schedule 13D misleadingly stated that, except for transactions listed on the form, “no transactions in the Common Stock were effected by any Reporting Person” in 60 days prior to Prestige’s attainment of its interest. Claiming deceptive “front-running,” the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted a civil suit. The jury found that Yang had violated the law by front-running and by filing a fraudulent disclosure. The court imposed a $150,000 penalty and enjoined Yang from future violations of U.S. securities law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Yang forfeited his arguments regarding the illegality of front-running and the materiality of his disclosure. View "Sec. & Eexch. Comm'n v. Yang" on Justia Law

In 2003, the SEC filed a civil suit against Custable, charging fraud involving “penny stocks” that yielded him at least $4 million. Criminal proceedings resulted in a long prison sentence for Custable. In 2010 he consented to entry of a judgment that ordered him to pay a $120,000 penalty plus $6.4 million in disgorgement of profits, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d). The SEC may either to remit the penalty money to the Treasury or to place it in the same fund as the disgorged profits, 15 U.S.C. 7246. Deciding that locating the defrauded victims would not be feasible, the Commission asked the court to allow it to pay to the Treasury all the disgorged profits that it had recovered. Hare, a purported victim of another Custable fraud and not a party, claimed to have an interest in the fund and asked the court to allow him to respond to any motion to disburse. The judge rejected Hare’s argument and granted the SEC’s motion to disburse the entire fund to the Treasury. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Hare failed to establish that he is within an exception to the rule that forbids a nonparty to appeal; the grounds that he advanced for relief were frivolous View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Custable" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the settlement of a securities class action brought on behalf of the purchasers of certain common stock of a corporation. Those who objected to the settlement and appealed the rejection of their objection argued that they were given too little time to register objections with the district court and that the district court should not have approved the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to class counsel. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s rejection of the objections at issue, as the objectors had notice in fact and a sufficient opportunity to have any of their objections heard by the court before it approved the settlement; and (2) dismissed the objectors’ appeal from the court orders approving the settlement and award of counsel fees, as the objectors had no standing to complain about the fee award. View "Hill v. State Street Bank Corp." on Justia Law