Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Sentinel specialized in short-term cash management, promising to invest customers’ cash in safe securities for good returns with high liquidity. Customers did not acquire rights to specific securities, but received a pro rata share of the value of securities in an investment pool (Segment) based on the type of customer and regulations that applied to that customer. Segment 1 was protected by the Commodity Exchange Act; Segment 3 customers by the Investment Advisors Act and SEC regulations. Despite those laws, Sentinel lumped cash together, used it to purchase risky securities, and issued misleading statements. Some securities were collateral for a loan (BONY). In 2007 customers began demanding cash and BONY pressured Sentinel for payment. Sentinel moved $166 million in corporate securities out of a Segment 1 trust to a lienable account as collateral for BONY and sold Segment 1 and 3 securities to pay BONY. Sentinel filed for bankruptcy after returning $264 million to Segment 1 from a lienable account and moving $290 million from the Segment 3 trust to the lienable account. After informing customers that it would not honor redemption requests, Sentinel distributed the full cash value of their accounts to some Segment 1 groups. After filing for bankruptcy Sentinel obtained bankruptcy court permission to have BONY distribute $300 million from Sentinel accounts to favored customers. The trustee obtained district court approval to avoid the transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547; 11 U.S.C. 549. The Seventh Circuit, noting the unique conflict between the rights of two groups of wronged customers, reversed. Sentinel’s pre-petition transfer fell within the securities exception in 11 U.S.C. 546(e); the post-petition transfer was authorized by the bankruptcy court, 11 U.S.C. 549. Neither can be avoided.View "Grede v. FCStone LLC" on Justia Law

Stinson’s scheme began in 2006 when he founded a fund, Life’s Good, with an alleged purpose to originate mortgage loans. Stinson advertised a “risk free” 16 percent annual return to investors with individual retirement accounts. He hired telemarketers to “cold call” potential investors and later produced a fraudulent prospectus and worked through investment advisors. Stinson did not use investors’ money to make mortgage loans, but diverted it to various personal business ventures that employed his family and friends without requiring them to work. In 2010, the SEC initiated a civil enforcement action. Stinson was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1505; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The SEC’s analysis showed that Life’s Good solicited $17.6 million from at least 262 investors and returned approximately $1.9 million. Many individuals lost retirement savings. Stinson entered an open guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to 400 months and ordered restitution of $14,051,246. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the court erroneously applied U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which increases the offense level by two points when “the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions.” The enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the source of a defendant’s gross receipts. View "United States v. Stinson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Brian McKye was charged with eight counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The district court refused to give the jury his tendered instruction that would have permitted the jury to decide whether the investment notes at issue were securities under federal securities law. He was convicted and received a 262-month sentence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by not giving the tendered instruction, and reversed the convictions.View "United States v. McKye" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to add a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k, against former outside directors of Peregrine. The district court denied leave to amend the complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile because the "negative causation" defense barred plaintiff's proposed claim. The court concluded that Section 11 imposed broad liability without regard to reliance or fraudulent intent for any material misstatements or omissions contained in a registration statement for the first year that the registration statement was available. In this instance, plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the material misstatements at issue caused his losses, and thus amending the complaint would not be futile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP" on Justia Law

Lead Plaintiffs filed suit under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k(a), 77(a)(2), and 77o, alleging that defendants made material misstatements and omissions in the offering of materials associated with the sales of Callable Dollar Preference Shares of Barclays. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice because the claims were either time-barred, inadequately pled or without an adequate lead plaintiff. After the district court's decision, this court decided Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., which held, inter alia, that defendants could be liable under section 11 and 12(a)(2) for misstatements of belief and opinion. The court concluded that Lead Plaintiffs' proposed amendments satisfactorily incorporated the clarification in the applicable law that occurred after the district court's decision and also addressed the other concerns identified by the district court. Accordingly, the court remanded to give Lead Plaintiffs the opportunity, with respect to the Series 5 Offering, to proceed with the claims in the Proposed Complaint and with a new-Lead Plaintiff. The court affirmed the dismissal of Series 2, 3, and 4 Offering claims as time-barred. View "In Re: Barclays Bank PLC Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of a certified class of securities fraud plaintiffs whose certification order was vacated in 2004 (the Drnek action), filed a class action in 2009 reciting the same claims previously outlined in the Drnek action. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims have been extinguished because they filed their class action more than five years after the Drnek court vacated its certification order. The court held that the Drnek court's vacatur of certification caused American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah tolling to cease and the statute of repose to resume running. Because plaintiffs brought this action after the statute of repose expired, their claim has been extinguished. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Hall, et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

A class of Motorola investors claimed that, during 2006, the firm made false statements to disguise its inability to deliver a competitive mobile phone that could employ 3G protocols. When the problem became public, the price of Motorola’s stock declined. The parties settled for $200 million. None of the class members contends that the amount is inadequate. Two objected to approval of counsel’s proposal that it receive 27.5 percent of the fund. One objector protested almost a month after the deadline and failed to file a claim to his share of the recovery. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal, stating that he lacks any interest in the amount of fees, since he would not receive a penny from the fund even if counsel’s share were reduced to zero. The other objector claimed that fee schedules should be set at the outset, preferably by an auction in which law firms compete to represent the class. Noting the problems inherent in such a system, the court held that the district judge did not abuse her discretion in approving the award.View "Liles v. Motorola Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchasers of condominiums in the Hard Rock Hotel San Diego, filed a putative class action suit under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., and California state law, against the Hotel's developer and others. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs have alleged the sale of a security based on their purchase of the condominiums. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts showing that they were offered the real-estate and rental-management contracts as a package. Plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that they were induced to buy the condominiums by the rental-management agreement. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not alleged the sale of a security and plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed. View "Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against MuniMae defendants, alleging that they committed securities fraud by falsely representing that the Company was in full compliance with a new accounting standard enacted in 2003; and concealing the substantial cost of correcting the accounting error. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, for failing to adequately plead scienter; affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under sections 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k(a), as time-barred under section 13's statute of repose; affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77(a)(2), for lack of standing; and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 15 claim because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a primary violation of the Securities Act. View "Yates v. Municipal Mortgage & Equity" on Justia Law

After defendants were found liable for securities fraud stemming from their practice of late trading in the mutual fund market, the district court ordered disgorgement and imposed a civil penalty. The court affirmed the district court's determination of liability and there was no abuse of discretion in the amount of disgorgement award. The court concluded, however, that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gabelli v. SEC, the court must vacate the district court's civil penalty award and remand for reconsideration. In Gabelli, the Supreme Court held that the so-called "discovery rule," which tolls a statute of limitations for crimes that were difficult to detect, did not apply to toll the five-year statue of limitations for fraud cases in SEC enforcement actions. The court also concluded that the language in 15 U.S.C. 77t(d)(2) did not permit the district court's interpretation that the civil penalty be imposed jointly and severally. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's imposition of joint and several liability for the civil penalty, vacated the penalty, and remanded for further proceedings.View "SEC v. Pentagon Capital Management" on Justia Law