Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
RELEVANT GROUP, LLC V. NOURMAND
Plaintiffs, property developers owning three hotels, alleged that Defendants, rival developers operating the Hollywood Athletic Club, abused the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) processes to extort funds in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants challenged several of Plaintiffs' hotel projects through CEQA objections and lawsuits, which Plaintiffs claimed were baseless and intended to obstruct their developments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protected Defendants' petitioning activities from statutory liability under the First Amendment. The district court found that Defendants' actions were not objectively baseless and thus did not fall within the sham litigation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The case was transferred from Judge Wright to Judge Gutierrez, who reconsidered and reversed the prior denial of summary judgment, concluding that the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering the prior judge's ruling. It also agreed that Defendants' CEQA challenges were not objectively baseless, as the actions had some merit and were not brought solely for an improper purpose. The court emphasized that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides broad protection to petitioning activities to avoid chilling First Amendment rights. Consequently, the court did not need to address Defendants' additional arguments regarding the applicability of RICO to litigation activities. View "RELEVANT GROUP, LLC V. NOURMAND" on Justia Law
In re: EPD INVESTMENT COMPANY V. KIRKLAND
The case involves EPD Investment Co., LLC (EPD) and its owner, Jerrold S. Pressman, who were found to have operated a Ponzi scheme. EPD was forced into Chapter 7 bankruptcy by its creditors, and the Trustee, Jason M. Rund, filed an adversary proceeding against Poshow Ann Kirkland and her husband, John Kirkland, seeking to avoid fraudulent transfers made by EPD to John. John had assigned his interest in EPD to the Bright Conscience Trust, for which Ann is the trustee.The United States District Court for the Central District of California bifurcated the trial, separating the claims against John and Ann. A jury trial was conducted for the claims against John, resulting in a verdict that EPD was a Ponzi scheme but that John received payments in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value. The bankruptcy court ruled that the jury's findings would be binding in the Trustee's claims against Ann. Ann appealed the judgment, particularly challenging the jury's finding that EPD was a Ponzi scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ann had standing to appeal due to her significant involvement in the case and her interest in the issues presented. The court rejected Ann's argument that the district court erred by not including a mens rea instruction requiring the jury to find that Pressman knew he was operating a Ponzi scheme that would eventually collapse. The court held that fraudulent intent could be inferred from the existence of a Ponzi scheme established through objective criteria. The court also rejected Ann's argument that the district court erred by instructing the jury that lenders are investors for purposes of a Ponzi scheme.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order affirming the judgment of the bankruptcy court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: EPD INVESTMENT COMPANY V. KIRKLAND" on Justia Law
COX V. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC
Ryan Cox filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the defendants manipulated the price of a cryptocurrency called HEX by artificially lowering its ranking on CoinMarketCap.com. The defendants include two domestic companies, a foreign company, and three individual officers of the foreign company. Cox claimed that the manipulation caused HEX to trade at lower prices, benefiting the defendants financially.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Cox needed to show the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona before invoking the Commodity Exchange Act's nationwide service of process provision. The court found that none of the defendants had sufficient contacts with Arizona.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes nationwide service of process independent of its venue requirement. The court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendants, CoinMarketCap and Binance.US, because they had sufficient contacts with the United States. The court also found that Cox's claims against these defendants were colorable under the Commodity Exchange Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the U.S. defendants and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the foreign defendants, Binance Capital and its officers, due to their lack of sufficient contacts with the United States. The court vacated the dismissal "with prejudice" and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against the foreign defendants without prejudice. View "COX V. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law
MAX ROYAL LLC V. ATIEVA, INC.
Plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud class action against Atieva, Inc., d/b/a Lucid Motors, and its CEO, Peter Rawlinson. They alleged that Rawlinson made misrepresentations about Lucid's production capabilities, which affected the stock price of Churchill Capital Corp. IV (CCIV), a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) in which the plaintiffs were shareholders. These misrepresentations were made before Lucid was acquired by CCIV. Plaintiffs purchased CCIV stock based on these statements but did not own any Lucid stock, as Lucid was privately held at the time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially held that the plaintiffs had statutory standing but dismissed the action for failure to allege a material misrepresentation. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint, but ultimately denied the amendments as futile and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged materiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on an alternative ground. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, following the Birnbaum Rule, which limits standing to purchasers or sellers of the stock in question. The court agreed with the Second Circuit's precedent in Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd., holding that purchasers of a security of an acquiring company (CCIV) do not have standing to sue the target company (Lucid) for alleged misstatements made prior to the merger. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. View "MAX ROYAL LLC V. ATIEVA, INC." on Justia Law
WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LTD. V. SILVER LAKE GROUP, L.L.C.
Hedge funds Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. and Walleye Manager Opportunities LLC sued large shareholders of Intelsat S.A., alleging that the shareholders engaged in insider trading by using material non-public information obtained from a meeting between Intelsat and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The plaintiffs claimed that the shareholders sold Intelsat stock during an after-hours block sale based on this information, which was not disclosed to the public.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, finding that Walleye failed to adequately plead that the defendants possessed material non-public information and acted with scienter. The court also held that Walleye had statutory standing under Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act, which requires that plaintiff-buyers trade contemporaneously with defendant-sellers. Walleye amended the complaint, but the district court dismissed the second amended complaint on similar grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Walleye had Article III standing to sue because it sufficiently pleaded both injury and causation by alleging that it bought Intelsat stock at a price inflated due to the defendants’ failure to disclose material information. The court also held that Walleye had statutory standing under Section 20A, even though it traded on the public market and did not buy the Intelsat shares sold during the after-hours block trade.However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Walleye failed to adequately plead that the defendants possessed material non-public information. The court found that Walleye did not specifically allege how Silver Lake, BC Partners, or David McGlade learned of the FCC meeting or what material non-public information they possessed. The court also held that the alleged information was not material, as it did not significantly alter the total mix of information available to the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LTD. V. SILVER LAKE GROUP, L.L.C." on Justia Law
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASS’N OF NEW MEXICO V. EARLEY
A group of retirement and pension funds filed a consolidated putative securities class action against PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (collectively, PG&E) and some of its current and former officers, directors, and bond underwriters (collectively, Individual Defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that all the defendants made false or misleading statements related to PG&E’s wildfire-safety policies and regulatory compliance. Shortly after the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, automatically staying this action as against PG&E but not the Individual Defendants. The district court then sua sponte stayed these proceedings as against the Individual Defendants, pending completion of PG&E’s bankruptcy case.The district court for the Northern District of California issued a stay of the securities fraud action against the Individual Defendants, pending the completion of PG&E's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The court reasoned that the stay would promote judicial efficiency and economy, as well as avoid the potential for inconsistent judgments. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by entering the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the Moses H. Cone doctrine because the stay was both indefinite and likely to be lengthy. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the stay as to the Individual Defendants. The court held that when deciding to issue a docket management stay, the district court must weigh three non-exclusive factors: the possible damage that may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and judicial efficiency. The appellate court vacated the stay and remanded for the district court to weigh all the relevant interests in determining whether a stay was appropriate. View "PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASS'N OF NEW MEXICO V. EARLEY" on Justia Law
Espy v. J2 Global, Inc.
The case involves Jonathan Espy, a shareholder of J2 Global, Inc., who alleged that the company and its individual defendants committed securities fraud. Espy claimed that J2 made materially misleading statements by omitting key facts about a 2015 acquisition and a 2017 investment, and concealed underperforming acquisitions through consolidated accounting practices. He also alleged that investors learned of J2’s corporate mismanagement and deception not from J2’s disclosures, but from two short-seller reports.The district court dismissed Espy's complaint twice, stating that he failed to sufficiently plead scienter, which is the intent to deceive or act with deliberate recklessness. The court found that Espy's allegations, including statements from two confidential former employees, did not establish reliability or personal knowledge, or demonstrate that J2 acted with the intent to deceive or with deliberate recklessness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Espy failed to sufficiently plead scienter because he did not state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that J2 acted with the intent to deceive or with deliberate recklessness. The court also held that Espy failed to sufficiently plead loss causation by showing that J2’s misstatement, as opposed to some other fact, foreseeably caused Espy’s loss. The court concluded that the two short-sellers’ reports did not qualify as corrective disclosures because one did not relate back to the alleged misrepresentations in Espy’s complaint, and the other’s analysis was based entirely on public information and required no expertise or specialized skills beyond what a typical market participant would possess. View "Espy v. J2 Global, Inc." on Justia Law
In re Alavi v. Genius Brands International, Inc.
The case involves shareholders of Genius Brands International, Inc., a children's entertainment company, who alleged that the company violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making fraudulent statements and omissions. The shareholders claimed that Genius concealed its relationship with a stock promoter, PennyStocks.com, misrepresented its relationship with Arnold Schwarzenegger, exaggerated the frequency of its show Rainbow Rangers on Nickelodeon Jr., falsely suggested that Disney or Netflix would acquire Genius, and overstated its rights to the works of comic book author Stan Lee.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the shareholders' complaint, finding that they failed to adequately allege that Genius's representations were misleading or that they caused the shareholders' losses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the shareholders adequately alleged that Genius's representations regarding PennyStocks were misleading and that they caused the shareholders' losses with respect to the Rainbow Rangers, Disney/Netflix, and Stan Lee claims. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claim regarding Genius's relationship with Schwarzenegger, finding that the shareholders did not adequately allege loss causation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Alavi v. Genius Brands International, Inc." on Justia Law
ZENOFF V. SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS, INC., ET AL
In the case involving Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc., its CEO, and its Vice President, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud class-action case brought by lead plaintiff Andrew R. Zenoff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by falsely claiming to have discovered a "cure" for COVID-19, resulting in a temporary surge in Sorrento's stock prices.The court held that the defendants' representations about the potential COVID-19 cure, when read in context, were not materially false or misleading. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to support the requisite strong inference of scienter, or intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The court noted that Sorrento's financial difficulties and the need to raise capital did not provide a strong inference of scienter. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not provide evidence of specific stock sales or purchases that would indicate an intent to manipulate stock prices.The court found that the plaintiff's allegations did not meet the specific requirements for claims of securities fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which include demonstrating a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, economic loss, and loss causation. The court concluded that the defendants' initial enthusiasm about the potential cure was not inherently false or misleading at the time, and the plaintiff failed to establish a strong inference of scienter. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. View "ZENOFF V. SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law
DARAMOLA V. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
The case involves a whistleblower-retaliation action brought by Tayo Daramola, a Canadian citizen, under the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts. Daramola was employed by Oracle Canada, a subsidiary of Oracle America, and worked remotely from Canada. He alleged that Oracle America and its employees retaliated against him for reporting suspected fraud related to one of Oracle's software products.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Daramola's action. The court held that the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts do not apply outside the United States. The court applied a presumption against extraterritoriality and concluded that the presumption was not overcome because Congress did not affirmatively and unmistakably instruct that the provisions should apply to foreign conduct.The court further held that this case did not involve a permissible domestic application of the statutes, given that Daramaola was a Canadian working out of Canada for a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. parent company. The court agreed with other circuits that the focus of the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision is on protecting employees from employment-related retaliation, and the locus of Daramola's employment relationship was in Canada. The court also concluded that Daramola did not allege sufficient domestic conduct in the United States in connection with his Dodd-Frank claim. The same reasoning disposed of Daramola’s California state law claims. View "DARAMOLA V. ORACLE AMERICA, INC." on Justia Law