Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”), a U.S.-based seller of flavoring and fragrance products, acquired Frutarom Industries Ltd. (“Frutarom”), an Israeli firm in the same industry. Leading up to the merger, Frutarom allegedly made material misstatements about its compliance with anti-bribery laws and the source of its business growth. Plaintiffs, who bought stock in IFF, sued Frutarom, alleging that those misstatements violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. The court concluded that Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to sue. Under the purchaser-seller rule, standing to bring a claim under Section 10(b) is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities issued by the company about which a misstatement was made. Plaintiffs here lack standing to sue based on alleged misstatements that Frutarom made about itself because they never bought or sold shares of Frutarom. View "Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd." on Justia Law

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Defendants JABA Associates LP and its general partners appealed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to Plaintiff, (“Trustee”), pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”). JABA was a good faith customer of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”) and held BLMIS Account Number 1EM357 (the “JABA Account”). The Trustee brought this action to recover the allegedly fictitious profits transferred from BLMIS to Defendants in the two years prior to BLMIS’s filing for bankruptcy. The district court granted recovery of $2,925,000 that BLMIS transferred to Defendants in the two years prior to BLMIS’s filing for bankruptcy, which made it recoverable property under SIPA.Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Second Appellate District affirmed reasoning that because is no genuine dispute of material fact that Bernard L. Madoff transferred the assets of his business to Defendants, which made it recoverable property under SIPA, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The court reasoned that here Here, Defendants argue that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize an award of prejudgment interest because the statute is silent. Yet Defendants do not make any argument that this silence is dispositive. Further, the court wrote that prejudgment interest has been awarded against other similarly situated defendants in related SIPA litigation. Thus, the district court appropriately balanced the equities between the parties. Given this, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting an award of 4 percent prejudgment interest to the Trustee. View "In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs suing individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, appealed from an August 2020 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on the ground of forum non conveniens, their amended complaint against defendants E‐Commerce China Dangdang Inc. (ʺDangdangʺ), its controlling shareholders, and others, alleging negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Sections 10(b), 13(e), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (ʺExchange Actʺ) and rules promulgated thereunder, in connection with Dangdangʹs 2016 ʺgoing‐privateʺ merger and the purchase by its controlling shareholders of its outstanding publicly‐traded shares, listed as American Depositary Shares (or ʺADSsʺ) on the New York Stock Exchange (or ʺNYSEʺ).On appeal, plaintiffs argue principally that the district court erred in concluding that the forum selection clause was not applicable to all of the defendants and to all of plaintiffsʹ claims, and in according unwarranted weight to public‐interest factors pointing toward dismissal.The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment concluding that the forum selection clause was not applicable to all of defendants and to all of plaintiffsʹ claims. The court held the district court principally misinterpreted the scope of the forum selection clause. View "Fasano v. Guoqing Li" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff claimed that UBS Securities, LLC and UBS AG (together “UBS”) fired him in retaliation for reporting alleged fraud on shareholders to his supervisor. Plaintiff sued UBS under the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A, and he ultimately prevailed at trial.   The Second Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded to the district court for a new trial. The court explained that the district court did not instruct the jury that a SOX anti-retaliation claim requires a showing of the employer’s retaliatory intent. Section 1514A prohibits publicly traded companies from taking adverse employment actions to “discriminate against an employee . . . because of” any lawful whistleblowing act. 18 U.S.C. Section 1514A(a). Accordingly, the court held that this provision requires a whistleblower-employee, like Plaintiff, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer took the adverse employment action against the whistleblower-employee with retaliatory intent—i.e., an intent to “discriminate against an employee . . . because of” lawful whistleblowing activity. The district court’s legal error was not harmless. View "Murray v. UBS Securities" on Justia Law

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Petitioner worked at a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (“RBS” or “the Bank”) for six weeks in the fall of 2007 before resigning, prompted by what he believed to be unlawful practices engaged in by the Bank in connection with its portfolio of residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”).   Petitioner later formally submitted information to the SEC about the Bank’s misconduct. The SEC itself took no action against the Bank but gave the information to the Department of  Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), each of which had already begun RMBS-related investigations into the Bank.   Petitioner n applied to the SEC for an award under its whistleblower program (the “Program”), established in 2010 by Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act. The SEC denied his claim. Petitioner petitioned for judicial review.   The Second Circuit denied the petition holding that it found no error in the SEC’s construction of Section 21F to require an action “brought by the Commission” to support a whistleblower award. The court further decided that, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, investigative and information-sharing activities engaged in by the SEC are not “covered judicial or administrative action[s]  brought by the Commission under the securities laws” or “actions” as to which the DOJ  and FHFA settlements can be considered “related.” Thus, the court adopted the Commission’s determination that Petitioner was not entitled to an award under the Program because the Commission did not bring a covered action. View "Hong v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

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The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought scheme liability claims in a 2017 enforcement action against Rio Tinto plc, Rio Tinto Limited, and its CEO and CFO, pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and pursuant to Section 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). Citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Lentell”), the district court dismissed the scheme liability claims in a March 2019 order (the “Dismissal Order”) on the ground that the conduct alleged constituted misstatements and omissions only, and is, therefore, an insufficient basis for scheme liability.   On appeal, the SEC contended that Lorenzo abrogates Lentell.  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling finding that Lentell remains sound. The question on appeal was whether misstatements and omissions--without more--can support scheme liability pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder, and Securities Act Section 17(a)(1) and (3).   The court explained that while Lorenzo acknowledges that there is leakage between and among the three subsections of each provision, the divisions between the subsections remain distinct. Until further guidance from the Supreme Court, Lentell binds: misstatements and omissions can form part of a scheme liability claim, but an actionable scheme liability claim also requires something beyond misstatements and omissions, such as dissemination. View "SEC v. Rio Tinto" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, investors in 22nd Century Group, alleged on behalf of an investor class that (1) Defendants engaged in an illegal stock promotion scheme in which they paid authors to write promotional articles about the company while concealing the fact that they paid the authors for the articles; and (2) Defendants failed to disclose an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) into the company’s financial control weaknesses. Plaintiffs alleged they were harmed after public articles revealed the promotion scheme and stock prices fell. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim.   On appeal, Plaintiffs argued (1) they adequately alleged material misrepresentations sufficient to sustain claims under SEC Rule 10b-5; (2) their claim under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act was premised on a valid predicate violation of Section 10(b); and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. On the first and second points, the court agreed that the allegation that Defendants failed to disclose the SEC investigation states a material misrepresentation and could also support Section 20(a) liability. However, the court found no merit in the remaining challenges. The court reasoned that because the complaint does not adequately allege that Defendants had a duty to disclose that they paid for the articles’ publication, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the existence of the stock promotion scheme constituted a materially misleading omission. View "Noto v. 22nd Century Grp." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Bristol-Myers's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a securities class action brought by investors. This securities class action arose from a failed clinical trial conducted to ascertain whether a cancer drug in development would be more effective than chemotherapy in treating a specific type of lung cancer. The second amended complaint alleged that the drop in stock price was attributable to the study's failure, and that Bristol-Myers had obscured the risk of such failure by declining to disclose the precise PD-L1 expression threshold in cancer cells and by misrepresenting that the study focused on patients "strongly" expressing PD-L1.The court concluded that the investors failed to adequately allege a material misstatement or omission or facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. In this case, rates of PDL1 expression remained a topic of research throughout the putative class period; there was no generally understood meaning of "strong" expression that contradicted Bristol-Myers’s use of the term to mean 5%; and some observers correctly predicted Bristol-Myers's use of a 5% threshold before it was publicly disclosed. Furthermore, the complaint alleges no facts indicating that Bristol-Myers had an obligation to disclose the precise threshold; Bristol-Myers cautioned the public that it would not do so; and the complaint fails to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. View "Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

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The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires defendants convicted of certain crimes to reimburse their victims for “lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The Second Circuit previously held that “other expenses” could include attorneys’ fees incurred by victims while helping the government investigate and prosecute the defendant and costs incurred while privately investigating the defendant. The Supreme Court subsequently held that “the words ‘investigation’ and ‘proceedings’ are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings.”Afriyie was convicted of securities fraud after trading on inside information he misappropriated from his employer, MSD. The district court entered the restitution order, covering the fees MSD paid its law firm to guide MSD’s compliance with investigations by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the SEC; to help prepare four MSD witnesses to testify at Afriyie’s criminal trial; and to represent MSD during the post-verdict restitution proceedings.The Second Circuit held that attorneys’ fees can sometimes be “other expenses” but a victim cannot recover expenses incurred while participating in an SEC investigation. Restitution is appropriate only for expenses associated with criminal matters; civil matters, including SEC investigations, even if closely related to a criminal case do not qualify. View "United States v. Afriyie" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of Hain's motion to dismiss a class action alleging securities fraud for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs alleged that Hain violated Section 10(b) and section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by asserting in public statements that Hain's favorable sales figures were attributable to strong consumer demand for its products while failing to disclose that demand for its products was declining and that a significant percentage of sales was in fact attributable to the practice of channel stuffing.The court held that the district court erred in granting Hain's motion because the district court relied on the erroneous assumption that plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5(b) claim was contingent on plaintiffs successfully pleading a fraudulent business scheme or practice in violation of Rules 10b-5(a) or (c). The court also concluded that the district court erred in failing to consider the cumulative weight of all of plaintiffs' scienter allegations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law