Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

To safeguard investors and restore trust in financial markets after the Enron collapse, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which provides that no public company nor any contractor or subcontractor of such a company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of whistleblowing activity, 18 U. S. C. 1514A(a). Plaintiffs are former employees of FMR, private companies that contract to advise or manage mutual funds. As is common in the industry, those mutual funds are public companies with no employees. Plaintiffs allege that they blew the whistle on putative fraud relating to the mutual funds and suffered retaliation by FMR. FMR argued that the Act protects only employees of public companies, and not employees of private companies that contract with public companies. The district court denied FMR’s motion to dismiss. The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the term “an employee” refers only to employees of public companies. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that section 1514A’s whistleblower protection includes employees of a public company’s private contractors and subcontractors. FMR’s interpretation would shrink the protection against retaliation by contractors to insignificance. The Court stated that its reading fits the goal of warding off another Enron debacle; fear of retaliation was the primary deterrent to reporting by the employees of Enron’s contractors. FMR’s reading would insulate the entire mutual fund industry from section 1514A. Virtually all mutual funds are structured to have no employees of their own and are managed, instead, by independent investment advisors. View "Lawson v. FMR LLC" on Justia Law

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1), forbids large securities class actions “based upon the statutory or common law of any State” in which plaintiffs allege “a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security,” and defines “covered security” to include only securities traded on a national exchange. Plaintiffs filed civil class actions under state law, contending that defendants helped Stanford and his companies perpetrate a Ponzi scheme by falsely representing that uncovered securities (certificates of deposit in Stanford Bank) were backed by covered securities. The district court dismissed, reasoning that, for purposes of the Act, the Bank’s misrepresentation that its holdings in covered securities made investments in its uncovered securities more secure provided the requisite “connection” between the state-law actions and transactions in covered securities. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not preclude the state-law class action. The Court noted the Act’s basic focus on transactions in covered, not uncovered, securities, and that use of the phrase “material fact in connection with the purchase or sale” suggests a connection that matters. A connection matters where the misrepresentation makes a significant difference to someone’s decision to purchase or to sell a covered security, not an uncovered one; the “someone” making that decision must be a party other than the fraudster. The Act and the underlying Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, are intended to protect investor confidence in the securities markets, not to protect persons whose connection with the statutorily defined securities is more remote than buying or selling. A broader interpretation of “connection” would interfere with state efforts to provide remedies for ordinary state-law frauds. This interpretation does not curtail the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement powers under 15 U S.C. 78c(a)(10). The SEC brought successful actions against Stanford and his associates, based on the Bank’s fraudulent sales of certificates of deposit. View "Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed shareholder derivative suits in California state court alleging that PICO's compensation policies violated state law. Defendants removed the cases to federal court, arguing that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(1), barred the suits. The court concluded that Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa(a), did not confer federal jurisdiction; defendants identified no significant federal issue that would confer jurisdiction; and the doctrine of complete preemption did not apply. Therefore, removal was improper and the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than remand them to state court. Accordingly, the court vacated with instructions to remand the cases to state court. The court dismissed defendants' cross appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "Dennis v. Hart" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the SEC's civil enforcement action against former infoUSA financial officers, including defendant. A jury found that defendant violated various securities laws and the district court imposed several civil penalties. Defendant subsequently appealed. The court concluded that defendant could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him because he failed to file a postverdict motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) after the district court denied his Rule 50(a) motion. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in admitting the testimony of the SEC's expert witness where the expert's use of the primary-purpose test as a means for applying the integrally-and-directly-related standard did not misconstrue a legal issue or alter the legal standard that defendant was required to apply as CFO. The court held, however, that it was not clear whether the jury made the finding necessary for the SEC's section 13(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(5), claim and, based on the claims the SEC asserted against defendant, the bad-faith finding was unnecessary to a final resolution of the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the conclusion that defendant violated section 13(b)(5) and the finding that defendant acted in bad faith, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the case in all other respects. View "SEC v. Dean, et al." on Justia Law

Walsh and Martin, principals of a futures and foreign currency trading company that acted as a “futures commission merchant” and as a “forex dealer member,” used customer funds for personal expenses, then concealed the company’s insolvency and their criminal conduct by misleading customers about the company’s ability to meet its obligations. Existing customers got account statements that falsely stated their available margin funds, and they solicited new customers by making false statements. They also used a Ponzi-like scheme for redemptions. Shortly before it was shut down, the company had $17,654,486 in unpaid customer liabilities and only $677,932 in assets. Walsh and Martin pleaded guilty to wire fraud, tax evasion, and to making false statements in a report to the Commodities Futures and Trading Commission, a Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6d(a)) violation. The district court sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of 150 and 204 months, respectively, and ordered each to pay $16,976,554 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a finding as to the amount of loss and restitution and to application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a finding that each was an officer or director of a futures commission merchant. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a civil enforcement action brought by the SEC against Symbol Technologies. Defendant, Symbol's president and COO, subsequently appealed the district court's order directing him to disgorge to the SEC over $41 million, plus prejudgment interest, and to pay a civil penalty, for violations of various securities laws. For a number of years, defendant and others engaged in a wide array of fraudulent accounting practices and other misconduct. The court found no error or abuse of discretion in the entry of the default judgment, the denial of defendant's recusal motion, and the disgorgement award. The court, however, remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest and for the clerical correction of a discrepancy between the amount of the civil penalty ordered in the district court's ruling and the amount of the penalty awarded in the judgment. View "SEC v. Razmilovic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action seeking to hold ProShares liable for material omissions and misrepresentations in the prospectuses for certain exchange-traded funds (ETFs) under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k and 77o. Plaintiffs alleged that registration of statements omitted the risk that the ETFs, when held for a period of greater than one day, could lose substantial value in a relatively brief period of time, particularly in periods of high volatility. The district court concluded that the disclosures at issue accurately conveyed the specific risk that plaintiffs asserted materialized. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the relevant prospectuses adequately warned the reasonable investor of the allegedly omitted risks. View "In Re: ProShares Trust Sec. Litig." on Justia Law

Bauer served as an officer in investment companies, on the pricing committee, and as chief compliance officer, implementing policies to prohibit employees from trading on nonpublic information regarding the securities held in the companies’ portfolios. Following trades for her personal account, the Securities and Exchange Commission charge Bauer with insider trading in connection with mutual fund redemption. The district court granted the SEC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the SEC rarely brings insider trading claims in connection with mutual fund redemption and that no federal court has ruled on the issue. The district court must determine whether Bauer’s alleged conduct properly fits under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, under which a corporate outsider misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. The court noted that Bauer did not argue that mutual fund redemptions cannot entail deception under the classical theory, but conceded that insider trading liability could attach to mutual fund redemptions if it could be shown that she knew the product was priced incorrectly, but that the issue must be resolved at the trial court level. View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bauer" on Justia Law

PFG and Acuvest had an agreement (later terminated) under which guaranteed Acuvest’s customers that Acuvest would conform its conduct to CEA mandates. Acuvest advised Prestwick with respect to an investment on which it suffered a substantial loss. Prestwick sued PFG, Acuvest, and two of Acuvest’s principals, alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1, a breach of fiduciary duty against the Acuvest defendants, and a guarantor liability claim against PFG. Prestwick argued that termination of PFG’s guarantee of Acuvest’s obligations under the CEA did not terminate protection “for existing accounts opened during the term of the guarantee.” The district court awarded summary judgment to PFG and dismissed the remaining defendants with prejudice so that Prestwick could appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that contracts between the parties were definitive and rejecting Prestwick’s assertion public policy and estoppel to overcome a decision that the guarantee agreement was properly terminated. View "Prestwick Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GE Energy, alleging violations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h) (the "whistleblower-protection provision", because GE Energy terminated him after he made an internal report of a possible securities law violation. The court concluded that the plain language of section 78u-6 limited protection under the whistleblower provision to those individuals who provided information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. In this instance, plaintiff did not provide any information to the SEC and, therefore, he did not qualify as a "whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim. View "Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C." on Justia Law