Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought this action against the Commission seeking a declaratory judgment that recently adopted regulations of the Commission regarding derivatives trading were unlawfully adopted and invalid, and seeking to vacate and set aside those regulations and to enjoin their enforcement. Plaintiffs contended that the Commission violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., in its rulemaking by: (1) failing to address rationales for broadening Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) exemptions; (2) failing to comply with the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 2(a), and offering an inadequate evaluation of the rule's costs and benefits; (3) including swaps in the trading threshold, restricting its definition of bona fide hedging, and failing to justify the five percent threshold; and (4) failing to provide an adequate opportunity for notice and comment. The court concluded, however, that the Commission did not act unlawfully in promulgating the regulations at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Investment Company Inst., et al. v. CFTC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his securities fraud conviction for insider trading. The court held that the district court properly analyzed the misstatements and omissions in the government's Title III wiretap application under the analytical framework prescribed in Franks v. Delaware; the alleged misstatements and omissions in the wiretap application did not require suppression; and the district court's jury instructions on the use of inside information satisfied the "knowing possession" standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rajaratnam" on Justia Law

Trustee sued on behalf of victims in the Ponzi scheme worked by Bernard Madoff under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa, alleging that, when defendants were confronted with evidence of Madoff's illegitimate scheme, their banking fees gave incentive to look away, or at least caused a failure to perform due diligence that would have revealed the fraud. The court concluded that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the Trustee from asserting claims directly against defendants on behalf of the estate for wrongdoing in which Madoff participated; SIPA provided no right to contribution; and the Trustee did not have standing to pursue common law claims on behalf of Madoff's customers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Trustee's claims. View "In Re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities" on Justia Law

The government alleged Defendant-Appellant Richard Clark, along with other co-conspirators, manipulated shares of several penny-stocks by using false and backdated documents to make those shares publically tradable, then coordinated the trading among themselves to create the false appearance of an active market for those shares. The shares were sold after the prices surged. The conspirators laundered the proceeds through multiple bank accounts and nominees (a "pump-and-dump" scheme). Defendant was charged and convicted on multiple counts for his participation in the scheme. He appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit, arguing: (1) the pretrial placement of a caveat on his property violated his constitutional rights; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the district court erred in refusing to appoint additional or substitute counsel better versed in complex securities issues; (4) the district court erred by failing to sever his case from his co-conspirator's; and (5) his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated by a fourteen-month delay between filing of the indictment and the start of trial. The Tenth Circuit addressed each of Defendant's contentions in its opinion, but found no discernible error. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Loffredi’s securities brokerage firm offered investments in certificates of deposit, mutual funds, and Treasury bills. Instead of actually purchasing investments requested by customers, Loffredi diverted their money to his personal expenses and business debts. He fraudulently misappropriated about $2.8 million over four years. A customer alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to irregularities in his financial statements. After an investigation, Loffredi was charged with five counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. He pleaded guilty to one count. The judge applied a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense involving at least 10 victims and imposed a sentence of 78 months. The presentence report counted as victims each of the 14 defrauded customers whose funds Loffredi had misappropriated. Loffredi argued that the only victim of the offense was his broker-dealer parent firm, which had reimbursed the losses of 12 of the 14 customers (Loffredi reimbursed the other two). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Loffredi never asserted that his fraud was painless for his customers and rejecting his “all-or-nothing” defense that the customers cannot be victims if they were reimbursed. View "Unted States v. Loffredi" on Justia Law

Daley opened an IRA with Merrill Lynch, rolling over $64,646 from another financial institution. He signed a contract with a "liens" provision that pledged the IRA as security for any future debts to Merrill Lynch. No such debts ever arose. Daley never withdrew money from his IRA, borrowed from it or used it as collateral. Two years later, Daley filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought protection for the IRAs, 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(C). The trustee objected, contending that the IRA lost its exempt status when Daley signed the lien agreement. The bankruptcy court and the district court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An IRA loses its tax-exempt status if the owner "engages in any transaction prohibited by section 4975 of the tax code. There are six such transactions, including “any direct or indirect” “lending of money or other extension of credit” between the IRA and its owner, 26 U.S.C. 4975(c)(1)(B). Daley never borrowed from the IRA, and Merrill Lynch never extended credit to Daley based on the existence of the IRA. View "Daley v. Mostoller" on Justia Law

FINRA filed a complaint against petitioner, charging that he violated FINRA rules by submitting false expense reports for reimbursement of nonexistent business travel and for a fraudulently purchased cellular telephone. In his petition for review, petitioner argued that the SEC abused its discretion in upholding a lifetime bar based on his violation of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Conduct Rule 2110. The court remanded to the SEC for further consideration, agreeing with petitioner that the SEC abused its discretion in failing to adequately address all of the potentially mitigating factors that the agency should have considered when it determined the appropriate sanction. View "Saad v. SEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, alleging that, in retaliation for Plaintiff's anti-regulatory stance, Defendant used his oversight powers to retaliate unlawfully against Plaintiff. The federal district court dismissed the complaint on immunity grounds. At issue before the First Circuit Court of Appeals was the scope and extent of the immunities offered to state officials, such as Defendant, whose duties encompass both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. The First Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that, notwithstanding Defendant's dual roles, Defendant was, with one exception, entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff's suit. View "Goldstein v. Galvin" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to avoid and recover certain payments made by debtor, QWUSA, to appellees, noteholders, in exchange for private placement notes that had been issued by one of debtor's affiliates. On appeal, appellants challenged the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court held that the payments were exempt from avoidance because they were both "settlement payments" and "transfers made... in connection with a securities contract," under 11 U.S.C. 546(e). The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the payments fell within the safe harbor for "transfers made... in connection with a securities contract." View "In re: Quebecor World (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

This is an adversary proceeding arising out of the bankruptcy of debtor (Derivium). Plaintiff (Grayson), assignee of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to grant summary judgment for defendants (Wachovia). The court concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the grant of summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Customer Transfers claim; summary judgment for Wachovia on Grayson's Cash Transfers claim; the bankruptcy court's determinations that the stockbroker defense applied to commissions; and the bankruptcy court's ruling that in pari delicto barred Grayson's tort claims against Wachovia. View "Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC" on Justia Law