Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing her claims against her ex-husband and his brother for failure to state a claim and untimeliness. Plaintiff alleged that, in representing a certain investment as worthless and concealing the $5.5 million received on its account, defendants conspired in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), committed common law fraud, and breached fiduciary duties, and that her ex-husband was unjustly enriched. The court held that the district court's reasons for dismissing the fraud-based claims were erroneous and that the district court erred in ruling on the existing record that the RICO, common law fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims were time-barred. The court sustained the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In these two civil enforcement actions for securities fraud, various entities that were defrauded by defendants appealed from the district court's order approving initial pro rata distributions recovered from defendants and associated entities by the Receiver in accordance with the Plan proposed by the Receiver. Interested parties, 3M Group, contended principally that the district court should have rejected the proposed pro rata distributions because under the Plan, fraud victims who chose allegedly safer investments fare no better than victims whose investments were riskier. Interested party, KCERA, contended that the district court should have rejected the proposed Plan because it did not provide an adjustment for inflation to compensate for longer-term investors. The court considered all of the contentions of the 3M Group and KCERA in support of their respective appeals and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "CFTC v. 3M Employee Welfare Benefit Assoc. Trust I, et al." on Justia Law

Saint Vincent's alleged that Morgan Stanley - the fiduciary manager of the fixed-income portfolio of Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers Retirement Plan - violated its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Saint Vincent's alleged that Morgan Stanley disproportionately invested the portfolio's assets in mortgaged-backed securities, including the purportedly riskier subcategory of "nonagency" mortgage-backed securities, despite warning signs that these investments were unsound. Although Saint Vincent's, as the fiduciary administrator of an ERISA-governed plan, was in a position to plead its claims with greater factual detail than was typically accessible to plaintiffs prior to discovery, and although it received two opportunities to amend its complaint, the Amended Complaint failed to plead sufficient, nonconclusory factual allegations to show that Morgan Stanley failed to meet its fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Amended Complaint. View "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc." on Justia Law

Willow Creek sued UBS, claiming a violation of Rule 10(b)-16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), because UBS failed to fully disclose its generally applicable margin rules until after it demanded that Willow Creek provide additional collateral for its margin account. Willow Creek also alleged that UBS failed to provide adequate notice before it revised those rules. The district court granted UBS's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the initial disclosure statement provided by UBS satisfied Rule 10b-16's disclosure requirements. The court concluded that, in this instance, where a broker disclosed its margin policies regarding the circumstances that could lead it to reevaluate the adequacy of the collateral in a customer's account and also indicated that more specific information about its margin policies was available to the customer, it need not disclose the precise, complex formulas it used to calculate its collateral requirements. Nor did Rule 10b-16(b) require UBS to provide advance notice to Willow Creek before it changed its margin rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "WC Capital Mgmt. v. UBS Sec., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an investor in the Fund, brought Maryland common-law claims and federal racketeering claims for violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d) against defendants, who were the Fund's fiduciaries. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his derivative claims. Applying Maryland law, the court held that demand was required on all of plaintiff's derivative claims and that the participation by directors in alleged wrongdoing was not sufficient to excuse demand. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's complaint. View "Gomes v. American Century Co., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of stock purchasers, alleging that Boeing committed securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5. The suit related to statements concerning the new 787-8 Dreamliner, which had not yet flown, and did not specify a damages figure. At argument the plaintiffs’ lawyer indicated that the class was seeking hundreds of millions of dollars. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(6) before deciding whether to certify a class. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal; Boeing cross-appealed denial of sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice, but remanded for consideration under 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(c)(1), (2), of Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers. No one who made optimistic public statements about the timing of the first flight knew that their optimism was unfounded; there is no securities fraud by hindsight. Plaintiffs’ lawyers had made confident assurances in their complaints about a confidential source, their only barrier to dismissal of their suit, even though none of them had spoken to the source and their investigator had acknowledged that she could not verify what he had told her. View "City of Livonia Emps' Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a proceeding brought to remedy securities fraud and recover assets that were the fruits of the fraud. The issues on appeal related to enforcement of, and compliance with, an order freezing various assets. The Trust and various individuals appealed from the magistrate judge's sanctioning of certain individuals. The court dismissed the appeals of Jill Dunn and David Wojeski for lack of jurisdiction, affirmed the sanction order as to Lynn Smith, and remanded to allow the Trust to contest the court's order regarding the disposition of trust property and for the magistrate judge to give additional guidance to the receiver as to disposition of the Trust property. View "SEC v. McGinn, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant George David Gordon was a former securities attorney convicted of multiple criminal charges relating to his alleged participation in a "pump-and-dump" scheme where he (along with others) violated the federal securities laws by artificially inflating the value of various stocks, then turning around and selling them for a substantial profit. The government restrained some of his property before the indictment was handed down and ultimately obtained criminal forfeiture of that property. On appeal, Defendant raised multiple issues relating to the validity of his conviction and sentence, and the propriety of the government’s conduct (both before and after trial) related to the forfeiture of his assets. In the end, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, as well as the district court’s forfeiture orders. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of Sterling Foster, for which Bear Stearns, as a clearing broker, performed certain settlement and record-keeping functions, alleged that Bear Stearns violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), by participating in Sterling Foster's market manipulation scheme. Bear Stearns pursued this interlocutory appeal from a decision and order of the district court granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations failed to trigger a duty of disclosure to Sterling Foster's clients such that the Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States presumption of reliance applied. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

MBIA sued as the third party beneficiary of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs) of a failed bank. It alleged that the FDIC as conservator of the successor bank had "approved," the PSAs and then breached its "Put Back" obligations under those agreements, resulting in investor claims of MBIA-issued insurance policies. At issue was whether payments made by MBIA to investors in mortgage securitizations of a failed bank constituted "administrative expenses" entitled to priority under the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)(A). The court held that the district court properly rejected MBIA's broad interpretation of "approved" in section 1821(d)(20) and dismissed MBIA's damage claims in counts I-V and VIII as prudentially moot in light of the FDIC's No Value Determination; the district court did not err in dismissing counts VI-VII for failure to state a claim; and the court rejected MBIA's alternative theory of recovery, claiming that FDIC Corporate was obligated under 12 U.S.C. 1821(m)(13) to fund the failed bank's losses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "MBIA Ins. Corp. v. FDIC" on Justia Law