Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Terex manufactures equipment. Apuzzo was its Chief Financial Officer. URI is an equipment rental company. Nolan was URI’s Chief Financial Officer. URI and Nolan, carried out fraudulent “sale-leaseback” transactions, to allow URI to recognize revenue prematurely and inflate profits. URI sold used equipment to GECC, a financing corporation, and leased it back. To obtain GECC’s participation, URI convinced Terex to agree to resell the equipment after the lease periods. Terex guaranteed that GECC would receive at least 96 percent of the purchase price for the equipment. URI secretly agreed to indemnify Terex for losses from the guarantee and to purchase new equipment from Terex. Apuzzo knew that if the extent of the transactions was transparent, URI would not be able to claim increased revenue under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Apuzzo disguised URI’s risks and obligations, and approved inflated invoices to conceal indemnifications. Following transactions under the scheme, the SEC charged that Apuzzo aided and abetted securities laws violations through his role in a fraudulent accounting scheme. The district court dismissed; the complaint plausibly alleged that Apuzzo had actual knowledge of the primary violation, but did not allege “substantial assistance.” The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Apuzzo associated himself with the venture, participated in it as in something that he wished to bring about, sought by his action to make it succeed. . View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Apuzzo" on Justia Law

Wehrs alleged that his stock broker, Wells, violated federal securities and state laws by executing unauthorized trades on Wehrs’s account, causing significant losses. Wells never answered the complaint or appeared in court; default judgment entered. The court later vacated with respect to damages and granted summary judgment in favor of Wehrs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first upholding denial of the motion to vacate as to liability. Although Wells took quick action to correct the default, and alleged excusable neglect, asserting that his withdrawn counsel did not provide him notice of the date by which he had to respond, he did not set forth a meritorious defense. Wells implicitly admitted the allegations in contesting damages and only made a single conclusory statement that the transactions were authorized. To permit Wells to argue that Wehrs should have sold his shares at sooner to mitigate damages would allow Wells to contest liability, rather than the extent of damages. A defaulting party has no right to dispute liability. The duty to mitigate is an affirmative defense and Wells waived his right to this defense by not filing a responsive pleading and could not raise it under the guise of proximate cause. View "Wehrs. v. Wells" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought suit as individuals and on behalf of a putative class of investors, alleging that Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. (Stifel) and two of its employees, Neil Harrison and Roger Compton, violated federal securities law. Stifel and Compton (Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations failed to satisfy the requirements for class action claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and dismissed Plaintiffs' compliant with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the district court's order with respect to Plaintiffs' individual claims, holding the district court erred in dismissing the claims without either staying the claims pending arbitration or undertaking an analysis of the claims under the PSLRA; and (2) affirmed the district court's order as it applied to Plaintiffs' class claims, holding that the court correctly determined that the complained failed to state viable class claims under Rule 23. Remanded. View "McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co." on Justia Law

Aladdin’s purportedly gross mismanagement allegedly caused plaintiffs to lose their entire $60 million investment in a collateralized debt obligation. A CDO pays investors based on performance of an underlying asset. The CDO at issue was “synthetic” in that its asset was not a traditional asset like a stock or bond, but was a derivative instrument, whose value was determined in reference to still other assets. The derivative instrument was a “credit default swap” between Aladdin CDO and Goldman Sachs based on the debt of approximately 100 corporate entities and sovereign states. The district court held that, because of a contract provision limiting intended third-party beneficiaries to those “specifically provided herein,” plaintiffs could not bring a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim and could not “recast” their claim in tort. The Second Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the parties intended the contract to benefit investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from Aladdin to the investors; that the relationship between Aladdin and plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort; and that Aladdin acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs’ losses. View "Bayerische Landesbank, NY v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

Traders employed by brokerage firms were indicted for conspiring with employees of Watley, a day trading firm, to commit securities fraud by providing their employers’ confidential information to Watley. After a mistrial on conspiracy to commit securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, 1349, the government retried the conspiracy count with honest services fraud and property fraud as the charged objects of conspiracy. The jury convicted under each theory. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Skilling, limiting honest services fraud to schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks. After sentencing, the SEC initiated administrative proceedings and disclosed transcripts of investigative depositions taken as early as 2004. With access to those transcripts, defendants moved for a new trial, contending that the transcripts included material required to be disclosed under Brady because it contradicted or undermined testimony of key government witnesses on a central question: whether allegedly misappropriated information was confidential under Carpenter v. U. S. The district court concluded that the jury would not have reached a different result had the transcripts been disclosed. The Second Circuit vacated. Failure to disclose portions of the transcripts violated Brady and undermined confidence in the verdict. The court also did not adequately instruct the jury on the scope of honest services fraud. View "United States v. Mahaffy" on Justia Law

Acticon is the lead plaintiff in a consolidated putative class action suit against China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited (NEP) brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) & 78t(a), and under SEC Rule 10b-5. Acticon alleges that NEP misled investors about its reported earnings, oil reserves, and internal controls. It further alleges that NEP revealed this information through a series of corrective disclosures and that in the trading days after each disclosure was made, NEP’s stock price dropped. NEP argues that these allegations are not sufficient to allege economic loss because its share price rebounded on certain days after the final disclosure to the point that Acticon could have sold its holdings and avoided a loss. The district court held that because Acticon had foregone multiple opportunities to sell its shares at a profit, it had not suffered an economic loss and dismissed. The Second Circuit vacated. Price recovery does not defeat an inference of economic loss. View "Rosado AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant initiated an arbitration against his former investment advisor, Fisher Investments, Inc. During the arbitration, the arbitrator (1) dismissed Appellant's Missouri statutory claims based on the arbitration agreement's Delaware choice-of-law provision, and (2) sua sponte prohibited Appellant from adding a federal securities law claim. Appellant then filed a civil action against Fisher Investments in federal district court, re-alleging the Missouri statutory and federal securities law claims and seeking a declaration that the arbitration agreement was void. The district court dismissed Appellant's claims without prejudice, concluding that Defendant had to complete arbitration before he could pursue remedies in federal court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was challenging an interim ruling and thus the complete arbitration rule applied, and (2) because the complete arbitration rule applied, the district court did not err in deciding that it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendant's claims. View "Wootten v. Fisher Invs., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit concerned a private securities fraud class action suit brought against a bank holding company and its management. State-Boston Retirement System, a shareholder and lead plaintiff, sought to prove that the holding company had misrepresented the level of risk associated with commercial real estate loans held by its subsidiary. After the trial, the District Court submitted the case to the jury on a verdict form seeking general verdicts and answers to special interrogatories. When the jury returned a verdict partially in favor of State-Boston, the holding company moved for judgment as a matter of law. Perceiving an inconsistency between two of the jury's interrogatory answers, the District Court discarded one of them and granted the motion on the basis of the remaining findings. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that was error: "[w]hen a court considers a motion for judgment as a matter of law -even after the jury has rendered a verdict- only the sufficiency of the evidence matters. . . .The jury’s findings are irrelevant." Despite the District Court’s error, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of loss causation, an element required to make out a securities fraud claim. The Court therefore affirmed. View "State-Boston Retirement System v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Based on GT’s audit of the financial statements of its client, Winstar, plaintiffs (Winstar stockholders) claimed that GT committed securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and made false and misleading statements in an audit opinion letter, 15 U.S.C. 78r. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit remanded, finding that triable questions of fact exist as to whether GT acted with scienter in making alleged misrepresentations in its audit opinion letter, whether plaintiffs purchased Winstar’s stock in actual reliance on those representations, and whether plaintiffs suffered losses as a result. View "Gould v. Winstar Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law

A substantial portion of Boston Scientific's sales in 2008-2009 were of cardiac rhythm management devices handled by a group within the company devoted to such products. In August 2009, Boston Scientific began an audit of CRM sales expense reports from recent trips of sales representatives who accompanied physician customers on tours of Boston Scientific manufacturing facilities; in September Boston Scientific received a subpoena from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, requesting information about contributions made by CRM to charities with ties to physicians or their families. Neither the audit nor the subpoena were initially disclosed to the public. After stock prices dropped, a purported class of shareholders sued for securities fraud, Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a)), and associated regulations, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, alleging that statements made by the company were materially false or misleading. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, noting other possible causes of loss and finding that plaintiffs did not establish scienter.View "In re: Boston Scientific Corp. Sec. Litigation" on Justia Law