Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Contorinis was a co-portfolio manager of the Fund, which invested in companies in the retail and personal products sectors. In 2000, Contorinis befriended Stephanou, who became an investment banker in the Mergers and Acquisitions group at UBS in 2002. Stephanou regularly provided confidential information to several friends and, in 2005, shared information about a planned acquisition with Contorinis and others. Based on a series of transactions following Stehanou’s disclosures the about and on-again, off-again acquisition, Contorinis was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading. The district court imposed a forfeiture order of $12.65 million. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. A challenged jury instruction adequately conveyed the definition of material, nonpublic information; the court was within its discretion in admitting evidence of contemporaneous trades by individuals who received inside information from the same source as Contorinis. The court vacated the order to forfeit gains acquired by Contorinis’s employer, but not by him.View "United States v. Contorinis" on Justia Law

During an eight-month period, Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. (“Hemispherx”) hired three different investment brokers to raise capital for it. Hemispherx hired the first two brokers at a time when it was difficult to sell Hemispherx’s stock. Months later, when market forces made Hemispherx’s stock much more attractive, Hemispherx hired a third broker was able very quickly to raise $31 million in capital for Hemispherx through stock sales. All three brokers focused their capital-raising efforts on several of the same prospective investors and, when several of those investors eventually purchased Hemispherx stock, a dispute arose as to which of the three brokers was entitled to a commission on the stock sales. The first investment broker Hemispherx hired, Defendant and Counterclaimant Mid-South Capital, Inc. (“Mid-South”), sought to recover a commission for its efforts in identifying investors and introducing them to Hemispherx. Hemispherx contendsed that Mid-South and its employees, Defendants Robert Rosenstein and Adam Cabibi, tortiously interfered with Hemispherx’s business relationship with its investors and with the third investment broker who ultimately closed the stock deals at issue here. The district court denied each party relief, granting judgment on the pleadings to Hemispherx on Mid-South’s breach-of-contract claim, and summary judgment to Hemispherx on Mid-South’s remaining claims and to Mid-South on Hemispherx’s intentional interference with business relationships claim. After review of the matter, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting summary judgment to Mid-South on the tortious interference claim; reversed the judgment on the pleadings on Mid-South's breach-of-contract claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hemispherx on Mid-South's promissory estoppel, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-South Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Auction Rate Securities are variable-rate equity or debt instruments that pay interest or dividends at rates set by periodic auctions. ARS were used as an alternative financing vehicle and were promoted as a safe, liquid alternative to money market funds. Merrill Lynch placed support bids at the auctions. In 2006, the SEC ordered investment banks, including Merrill Lynch, to cease intervention in the ARS market in the absence of adequate disclosures and found violations of 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(2). In 2007 Merrill Lynch discontinued placing support bids and auctions for ARS failed. Anschutz holds $18.95 million of “illiquid and severely impaired securities.” Anschutz claimed that because of the support bids, it earned less interest on its ARS that it otherwise would have earned; that it relied on the appearance of ARS liquidity manufactured by Merrill Lynch, and on previous success with similar ARS, in deciding to make purchases; and that credit agencies committed fraud in rating ARS at issue. The district court dismissed, holding that disclosures on the Merrill Lynch website, in conjunction with the SEC Order, were sufficient to apprise Anschutz of ARS support bidding practices and that Anschutz failed to allege any actionable misstatements by the rating agencies. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, securities fraud class actions were filed against AIG and other corporate and individual defendants, including Gen Re. The district court consolidated the actions and appointed as lead plaintiffs three Ohio public pension funds, for a putative class of investors who purchased AIG’s publicly traded securities between October 28, 1999, and April 1, 2005. The complaint alleged that AIG and Gen Re violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), (Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)), by entering into a sham $500 million reinsurance transaction designed to mislead the market and artificially increase AIG’s share price. After the parties reached a settlement agreement, the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify a settlement class, finding that the class could not satisfy the predominance requirement of FRCP 23(b)(3) because the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not apply to the class’s securities fraud claims. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that, under Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591(1997), a securities fraud class’s failure to satisfy the fraud-on-the-market presumption primarily threatens class certification by creating “intractable management problems” at trial. Because settlement eliminates the need for trial, a settlement class ordinarily need not demonstrate that the fraud-on-the-market presumption applies to its claims to satisfy the predominance requirement. View "In Re: Am. Int'l Grp. Sec. Litigation" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The government alleged that Defendant's sale of collateral pledged as security for a loan from a bank and his failure to carry out his disclosure duties under the security agreement amounted to a scheme to defraud for purposes of the bank, mail, and wire fraud statutes. The district court dismissed the indictment, finding (1) a false representation is a required element of a federal fraud offense and the indictment failed to allege any express misrepresentation by Defendant; and (2) absent a statutory, fiduciary, or independent disclosure duty, nondisclosure was insufficient to state a fraud claim under any of the charged offenses. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly dismissed the indictment for failure to state an offense, as the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a scheme to defraud under the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes. View "United States v. Steffen" on Justia Law

The collapse of investment manager Sentinel in 2007 left its customers in a lurch. Instead of maintaining customer assets in segregated accounts as required by the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1, Sentinel pledged customer assets to secure an overnight loan at the Bank of New York, giving the bank in a secured position on Sentinel’s $312 million loan. After filing for bankruptcy, Sentinel’s liquidation trustee brought attempted to dislodge the bank’s secured position. After extensive proceedings, the district court rejected the claims. Acknowledging concerns about the bank’s knowledge of Sentinel’s business practices, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The essential issues were whether Sentinel had actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud and whether the bank’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify equitable subordination, and the district court made the necessary credibility determinations. Even if the contract with the bank enabled illegal activity, the provisions did not themselves cause the segregation violations. View "Grede v. Bank of NY Mellon Corp." on Justia Law

Terex manufactures equipment. Apuzzo was its Chief Financial Officer. URI is an equipment rental company. Nolan was URI’s Chief Financial Officer. URI and Nolan, carried out fraudulent “sale-leaseback” transactions, to allow URI to recognize revenue prematurely and inflate profits. URI sold used equipment to GECC, a financing corporation, and leased it back. To obtain GECC’s participation, URI convinced Terex to agree to resell the equipment after the lease periods. Terex guaranteed that GECC would receive at least 96 percent of the purchase price for the equipment. URI secretly agreed to indemnify Terex for losses from the guarantee and to purchase new equipment from Terex. Apuzzo knew that if the extent of the transactions was transparent, URI would not be able to claim increased revenue under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Apuzzo disguised URI’s risks and obligations, and approved inflated invoices to conceal indemnifications. Following transactions under the scheme, the SEC charged that Apuzzo aided and abetted securities laws violations through his role in a fraudulent accounting scheme. The district court dismissed; the complaint plausibly alleged that Apuzzo had actual knowledge of the primary violation, but did not allege “substantial assistance.” The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Apuzzo associated himself with the venture, participated in it as in something that he wished to bring about, sought by his action to make it succeed. . View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Apuzzo" on Justia Law

Wehrs alleged that his stock broker, Wells, violated federal securities and state laws by executing unauthorized trades on Wehrs’s account, causing significant losses. Wells never answered the complaint or appeared in court; default judgment entered. The court later vacated with respect to damages and granted summary judgment in favor of Wehrs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first upholding denial of the motion to vacate as to liability. Although Wells took quick action to correct the default, and alleged excusable neglect, asserting that his withdrawn counsel did not provide him notice of the date by which he had to respond, he did not set forth a meritorious defense. Wells implicitly admitted the allegations in contesting damages and only made a single conclusory statement that the transactions were authorized. To permit Wells to argue that Wehrs should have sold his shares at sooner to mitigate damages would allow Wells to contest liability, rather than the extent of damages. A defaulting party has no right to dispute liability. The duty to mitigate is an affirmative defense and Wells waived his right to this defense by not filing a responsive pleading and could not raise it under the guise of proximate cause. View "Wehrs. v. Wells" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought suit as individuals and on behalf of a putative class of investors, alleging that Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. (Stifel) and two of its employees, Neil Harrison and Roger Compton, violated federal securities law. Stifel and Compton (Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations failed to satisfy the requirements for class action claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and dismissed Plaintiffs' compliant with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the district court's order with respect to Plaintiffs' individual claims, holding the district court erred in dismissing the claims without either staying the claims pending arbitration or undertaking an analysis of the claims under the PSLRA; and (2) affirmed the district court's order as it applied to Plaintiffs' class claims, holding that the court correctly determined that the complained failed to state viable class claims under Rule 23. Remanded. View "McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co." on Justia Law

Aladdin’s purportedly gross mismanagement allegedly caused plaintiffs to lose their entire $60 million investment in a collateralized debt obligation. A CDO pays investors based on performance of an underlying asset. The CDO at issue was “synthetic” in that its asset was not a traditional asset like a stock or bond, but was a derivative instrument, whose value was determined in reference to still other assets. The derivative instrument was a “credit default swap” between Aladdin CDO and Goldman Sachs based on the debt of approximately 100 corporate entities and sovereign states. The district court held that, because of a contract provision limiting intended third-party beneficiaries to those “specifically provided herein,” plaintiffs could not bring a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim and could not “recast” their claim in tort. The Second Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the parties intended the contract to benefit investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from Aladdin to the investors; that the relationship between Aladdin and plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort; and that Aladdin acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs’ losses. View "Bayerische Landesbank, NY v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law