Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal of their amended and second amended complaints for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The two complaints asserted claims for relief against defendants under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Plaintiffs claimed that CBS delayed interim impairment testing of the corporation's intangible assets despite indicia that such a test was necessary at an earlier date. The court affirmed the district court's opinion dismissing the complaints and held that the district court's conclusion was reinforced by Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp. View "City of Omaha v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

The patent, titled "Automated Exchange for Trading Derivative Securities," discloses an invention directed to an automated exchange for trading options contracts that allocates trades among market professionals and that assures liquidity. The patent distinguishes an automated exchange from the traditional, floor-based "open-outcry" system, under which trading takes place through oral communications between market professionals at a central location in open view of other market professionals. The patent purports that it can "provide an automated system for matching previously entered orders and quotations with incoming orders and quotations on an exchange for securities, which will improve liquidity and assure the fair handling of orders." The district court held that the patent is not infringed by the trading system of Chicago Board Options Exchange. The Federal Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in construing "system memory means," "matching," and "automated exchange." View "Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int' Sec. Exch., L.L.C." on Justia Law

A corporation that wants its shares to be traded on an exchange or through broker-dealers that make national markets must register the securities under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77j. Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 8m(a), requires the issuer to file periodic reports. Plaintiff registered securities and persuaded broker-dealers to make markets in them, but fell behind with its filings. After eight years, during which plaintiff fell farther behind, the SEC opened a formal proceeding. After a hearing and disclosure that plaintiff could not pay an auditor to certify recent financial statements, the SEC revoked plaintiff's registration; trading in its shares came to a halt. While judicial review was pending, plaintiff filed a new registration, which has not been revoked despite plaintiff's failure to catch up on reports. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the case as moot. To commence trading in any newly registered stock, a broker-dealer needs approval from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. When a potential market-maker sought approval, it noted SEC comments on plaintiff's new registration. Setting aside the SEC revocation decision would not oblige FINRA to allow trading to resume. View "Tara Gold Resources Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this civil enforcement action, the SEC sued Morgan Keegan, alleging that, in the critical time period of late 2007 and early 2008, Morgan Keegan's brokers (1) misrepresented that auction rate securities (ARS) were safe cash-equivalents with no liquidity risk and (2) despite myriad auction failures and significant trouble in the ARS market, continued to recommend ARS as short-term, liquid investments and failed to disclose the known liquidity risk. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Morgan Keegan based on the "materiality" element of the securities violations charged. The court's holding was narrow and limited to materiality and did not address whether the SEC had met any other element of its claims or whether the SEC would ultimately prevail in the litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The SEC filed a complaint. The court appointed a receiver to handle defendants' assets for distribution among victims of the $31 million fraud. Assets included oil and gas leases. SonCo filed a claim. The parties came to terms; the court entered an agreed order that required SonCo to pay $580,000 for assignment of the leases. The wells were unproductive, because of freeze orders entered to prevent dissipation of assets; the lease operator, ALCO, had posted a $250,000 bond with the Texas Railroad Commission. The bond was, in part, from defrauded investors. SonCo was ordered to replace ALCO as operator and to obtain a bond. More than a year later, SonCo had not posted the bond or obtained Commission authorization to operate the wells, but had paid for the assignment. The judge held SonCo in contempt and ordered it to return the leases, allowing the receiver to keep $600,000 that SonCo had paid. SonCo returned the leases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that SonCo willfully violated the order, but vacated the sanction. The judge on remand may: reimpose the sanction, upon demonstrating that it is a compensatory remedy for civil contempt; impose a different, or no sanction; or proceed under rules governing criminal contempt. View "SonCo Holdings, LLC v. Bradley" on Justia Law

In this civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Defendants-Appellants Brian Smart and Smart Assets, LLC, the district court entered a $4,715,580 judgment against Defendants for operating a Ponzi scheme, and it permanently enjoined them from further violations of federal securities laws. Defendant Smart appealed pro se. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding Defendant did not cite any evidence that would contradict declarations, bank records and other evidence submitted by the SEC. View "SEC v. Smart" on Justia Law

This case concerned the applicability of a standard "no-action clause" in a trust indenture governing a company's notes. The clause at issue stated that a noteholder could not "pursue any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities" unless the noteholder fell within one of two exceptions. At issue was whether noteholders who did not fall within a stated exception to the clause could nonetheless bring fraudulent transfer claims against the issuer of the securities and its directors and officers. Although the district court found the no-action clause inapplicable to the claims, the court disagreed and held that the language of the no-action clause controlled, barring noteholders from bringing suit. View "Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC, et al. v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Participants in an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan brought suit under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1, claiming excessive fees on annuity insurance contracts offered to plan participants. The district court dismissed the ICA claims because only those maintaining an ownership interest in the funds could sue under the derivative suit provision and the participants are no longer investors in the funds in question. As to the ERISA claims, the court dismissed because participants failed to make a pre-suit demand upon the plan trustees to take appropriate action and failed to join the trustees as parties. The Third Circuit affirmed with regards to the ICA claims, but vacated on the ERISA counts, holding that the statute does not require pre-suit demand or joinder of trustees. View "Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

MGIC provides private insurance on mortgage loans and incurred large losses in the financial crunch that began with the decline of prices of securities based on packages of mortgage loans. Class-action suits filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were consolidated and were dismissed when the judge concluded that the complaint did not meet the standard set by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u–4(b). A single plaintiff appealed, based on fraud that allegedly occurred during MGIC's quarterly earnings call on July 19, 2007. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the complained-of statement was true and that the complaint failed PSLRA's requirement for pleading scienter. At most plaintiff could allege that MGIC’s managers should have seen the looming problem, and establish negligence rather than the state of mind required for fraud. MGIC's managers did not have any private information that they could have revealed. View "Fulton Cty Emp. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp." on Justia Law

In addition to about $4 million invested through his family corporation, Nonneman personally invested about $15 million in OKO for domestic oil and gas exploration, although he had no experience in such businesses, was showing signs of dementia, and suffered disabilities. In 2003, Nolfi assumed management of Nonneman’s affairs and it was apparent that the OKO investments would yield no returns. Of 128 wells, only 11 produced oil, and did not produce enough to recoup the investment. Nolfi filed suit in Ohio state court and learned facts that gave rise to federal and state securities claims. He filed in federal court, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 77l(a)(1); violations of the Ohio Blue Sky laws by the sale of unregistered securities; federal securities fraud; misrepresentation; common law fraud; breach of fiduciary duties; and breach of contract. The cases were consolidated and, after complicated rulings concerning limitations periods, the district court entered judgment for Nonneman. Despite having stated rescissory damages as more than $7 million, the jury only listed an award of $1,777,909 on its verdict form. The court held that plaintiffs had waived their right to challenge the verdict. Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Nolfi v. OH KY Oil Corp." on Justia Law