Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries
Ravenswood Investment Co. v. Avalon Correctional Svcs.
Avalon Correctional Services, Inc., a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, operates for-profit correctional facilities. Ravenswood Investment Company (RIC) and Ravenswood Investments III (RIII), shareholders of Avalon, are both New York limited partnerships. In 2005, RIC and RIIII alleged that Avalon deregistered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and ceased filing financial reports. In 2008, RIC and RIII demanded inspection of Avalon's books and records, asserting a right provided to shareholders under Oklahoma law. Rather than supply the requested information, Avalon sued RIC and RIII in federal court to seek a declaration that Avalon was not subject to Oklahoma law with respect to the records. Avalon alleged diversity of citizenship as basis for jurisdiction. After the district court entered interim orders dismissing many claims, entering summary judgment on another, and resolving various discovery disputes, the parties discovered that complete diversity never existed and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather than dismiss the case in its entirety, the court severed some previously decided claims between diverse parties and made their final dispositions. The court then dismissed the remainder of the claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that although dismissing a nondiverse party is an available procedure for curing a lack of complete diversity in some circumstances, the district court's order in this case failed to create complete diversity. Therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to be dismissed in its entirety.
View "Ravenswood Investment Co. v. Avalon Correctional Svcs." on Justia Law
MBIA Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.
This insurance coverage dispute raised issues arising out of financial regulators' investigations in alleged accounting misstatements by MBIA, Inc. (MBIA) and related litigation. Based on these events, MBIA made claims under two $15 million director and officer (D&O) insurance policies it had purchased from Federal Insurance Co. (Federal) and ACE American Insurance Co. (ACE), seeking coverage for costs associated with these claims as losses under the policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MBIA on two of its three coverage claims but granted summary judgment in favor of Federal and ACE on one of MBIA's coverage claims. The parties subsequently appealed the district court's judgments. The court affirmed the district court with respect to coverage for all costs except those related to the independent consultant where the independent consultant's investigation was a covered cost under the policies. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of MBIA on its claim for coverage of the independent consultant's costs. View "MBIA Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Reese v. BP Exploration Alaska Inc.
This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Reese v. BP Exploration Alaska Inc." on Justia Law
In Re: Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., et al.
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (Enron) sought to avoid and recover payments it made to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity from appellees, whose notes were redeemed by Enron. On appeal, Enron challenged the district court's conclusion that 11 U.S.C. 546(e)'s safe harbor, which shielded "settlement payments" from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, protected Enron's redemption payments whether or not they were made to retire debt or were unusual. The court affirmed the district court's decision and order, holding that Enron's proposed exclusions from the reach of section 546(e) have no basis in the Bankruptcy Code where the payments at issue were made to redeem commercial paper, which the Bankruptcy Code defined as security. Therefore, the payments at issue constituted the "transfer of cash ... made to complete [a] securities transaction" and were settlement payments within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 741(8). The court declined to address Enron's arguments regarding legislative history because the court reached its conclusion based on the statute's plain language. View "In Re: Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., et al." on Justia Law
SEC v. Johnson, Jr., et al.
In this civil enforcement action, a jury found appellant aided and abetted a securities fraud by his former employer in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78t(e). At issue was whether the district court erred in allowing appellant's trial to proceed in the District of Columbia pursuant to the "co-conspirator theory of venue." The court held that the SEC failed to lay venue in the District of Columbia under the "straightforward language of [section 78aa]." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court on the basis of improper venue in light of Olberling v. Illinois Central and the district court was instructed to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "SEC v. Johnson, Jr., et al." on Justia Law
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Securities Law, U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
Costello v. Grundon
The borrowers, former high-level employees, participated in the company’s shared investment program by purchasing company stock. The entire purchase price was funded by personal loans from banks. The company guaranteed the loans, received loan proceeds directly from the banks, and held the shares. Some participants made a profit, but in 2001 the company filed for bankruptcy. After settling with the lenders, the bankruptcy trustee filed actions against the borrowers. The district court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The borrowers may have enough evidence to satisfy the "in the business of supplying information" element of a negligent misrepresentation defense. The borrowers may raise margin Regulations G and U as an affirmative excuse-of-nonperformance defense; it is not clear whether the borrowers, the banks, the company, or the plan violated those regulations. Summary judgment on the Securities and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Section 17(a) illegality defenses was also in error.View "Costello v. Grundon" on Justia Law
United States v. Chapman, et al.
This is the second appeal arising from the failed prosecution of defendants for securities and investment fraud. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to reopen under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) based on an internal government memorandum (memo) written shortly after the district court dismissed the indictment. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that the memo did not show fraud on the court or provided a basis to reopen the case to allow discovery into that issue where the memo was not a revelation of new information about the discovery misconduct during trial and where the memo was consistent with the court's prior conclusion that the government's misconduct during trial was a mixture of intentional and negligent pretrial and trial acts and omissions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Todd, et al.
The SEC brought suit against senior officers of Gateway Incorporated ("Gateway") claiming that they unlawfully misrepresented Gateway's financial condition in the third quarter of 2000 in order to meet financial analysts' earnings and revenue expectations. After a three week trial, a jury found former Gateway financial executives, John J. Todd and Robert D. Manza, liable on all claims by the SEC. All parties appealed the district court's order in part. The court reversed the district court's order granting in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the antifraud claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., because substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that Todd and Manza at least recklessly misrepresented revenue related to the Lockheed transaction, and that Todd recklessly misrepresented revenue as to the VenServ transaction, in the third quarter of 2000. The court also reversed the district court's order granting Jeffrey Weitzen's, former Gateway President and CEO, motion for summary judgment as to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Weitzen knowingly misrepresented Gateway's financial growth as "accelerated" given his knowledge of the unusual Lockheed and AOL transactions. There were also issues of material fact as to whether Weitzen was a "control person" under Section 20(a). The court affirmed Weitzen's motion for summary judgment as to the Rule 13b2-2 claim because there was no evidence that Weitzen signed a letter to Gateway's auditors knowing that it misrepresented Gateway's financial position. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the aiding and abetting claims and their motions for a new trial.
Barclays Capital Inc., et al. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.
After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment for plaintiffs concluding that on seventeen occasions, defendant had infringed plaintiffs' copyrights in their research reports, and that by collecting and disseminating to its own subscribers the summary recommendations with respect to securities trading contained in plaintiffs' reports, defendant had committed the New York state law tort of "hot news" misappropriation. Defendant appealed the judgment and injunction against it on the "hot news" misappropriation claim. The court held that plaintiffs' claim against defendant for "hot news" misappropriation of the plaintiff financial firms' recommendations to clients and prospective clients as to trading in corporate securities was preempted by federal copyright law. Based upon principles explained and applied in National Basketball Association v. Motorola ("NBA"), the court held that because plaintiffs' claim fell within the "general scope" of copyright, 17 U.S.C. 106, and involved the type of works protected by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 102 and 103, and because defendant's acts at issue did not meet the exceptions for a "hot news" misappropriation claim as recognized by NBA, the claim was preempted. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court with respect to that claim.
Patel v. MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc., et al.
Lead plaintiff in this consolidated, but uncertified, class action securities lawsuit sued defendants alleging violations of section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78t(a). At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's lawsuit, reasoning that defendants did not have a duty to announce production failures to defendant's investors immediately and, in any event, plaintiff failed to allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of scienter as required by section 21D(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). The court held that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege an actionable omission or scienter for his claim and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed. The court also held that, because it affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 20(a) claim. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.