Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Bocchino, a stockbroker, learned from a superior that Traderz “might go public” and that the endeavor was supported by “some commitment” from a popular fashion model. Based solely on that, and without any independent investigation into the quality of the entity, Bocchino immediately sought investment from clients. Bocchino received over $40,000 in commissions from Traderz sales. The second involved Fargo. The source of Bocchino’s information regarding Fargo is unclear. Bocchino only obtained cursory documentation about the entity before soliciting sales. He did not conduct any independent investigation, despite awareness that Fargo’s principal’s “full-time ‘job’ was law student.” Bocchino received $14,000 in commissions for his clients’ stock purchases in Fargo. Traderz and Fargo turned out to be fraudulent ventures. The principals of each entity were criminally convicted, and the anticipated value of the investments vanished. The Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil law enforcement actions against those who sold investments in the entities. The bankruptcy court held that those civil judgments against Bocchino were nondischargeable, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, finding that collapse of the private placements was neither abnormal nor extraordinary given Bocchino’s lack of due diligence. View "In Re: Bocchino" on Justia Law

The SEC found that petitioner and his company repeatedly marked the close - buying or selling stock as the trading day ends to artificially inflate the stock's value - and sanctioned them accordingly. The court concluded that the Commission applied the correct legal standard and properly concluded that there is ample evidence petitioner manipulated the market by marking the close; petitioner was properly charged as a primary violator under both the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(1), (4); but the Commission cannot apply the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, to bar petitioner from associating with municipal advisors and rating organizations because such an application is impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review. The court vacated the portion of the SEC order that is impermissibly retroactive. View "Koch v. SEC" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the SEC's final order finding that petitioners violated Sections 204, 206, and 207 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-4, 80b-6(1)–(2), 80b-7, and Advisors Act Rule 204-1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. 275.204-1(a)(2). Determining that, by failing to disclose $210,000 in fees received from an investment manager, petitioners misrepresented that they were providing independent and conflict-free advice, the Commission imposed industry bars and cease-and-desist orders, ordered disgorgement, and levied a total of $650,000 in civil penalties. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the Commission reasonably interpreted Section 4E as not imposing a jurisdictional bar to late-filed actions, and that the Commission acted reasonably in imposing its sanctions. View "Montford and Co. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Trinity, a New York Episcopal parish, owns Wal-Mart stock and requested that Wal-Mart include its shareholder proposal in Wal-Mart’s proxy materials. Trinity’s proposal, linked to Wal-Mart’s sale of high-capacity firearms at about one-third of its 3,000 stores, asked Board of Directors to develop and implement standards for use in deciding whether to sell a product that “especially endangers public safety,” “has the substantial potential to impair the reputation of Wal-Mart,” and/or “would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and community values integral to the Company’s promotion of its brand.” The Securities and Exchange Commission’s “ordinary business” exclusion lets a company omit a shareholder proposal from proxy materials if the proposal relates to ordinary business operations. Wal-Mart obtained a “no-action letter” from the SEC, indicating that there would be no recommendation of an enforcement action against Wal-Mart if it omitted the proposal from its proxy materials. Trinity filed suit. The district court held that, because the proposal concerned the company’s Board (rather than management) and focused principally on governance (rather than how Wal-Mart decides what to sell), it was outside ordinary business operations. The Third Circuit reversed. “Stripped to its essence, Trinity’s proposal goes to the heart of Wal-Mart’s business: what it sells on its shelves.” View "Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired shares of K-V Pharmaceutical stock during the period in which the company launched and marketed Makena, its new prescription drug, designed to reduce the risk of pre-term labor for at-risk pregnant women. It had acquired rights to the drug from the FDA, under the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 360. In a putative class action, the plaintiffs alleged that K-V and three of its officers made materially false or misleading statements or omissions related to the product launch. The district court dismissed, holding the challenged statements were protected by the safe-harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b), and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter under the PSLRA. The district court also denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the complaint as it related to allegations from confidential witnesses. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. K-V’s statements fell within the PSLRA’s safe-harbor provision as forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language and are not actionable as a basis for a securities fraud action. View "Anderson v. K-V Pharma. Co." on Justia Law

Because a 1999 issue of cumulative preferred stock was impairing the company’s ability to raise capital, Emmis signed holders of 60% of the preferred shares to swaps. Emmis purchased shares; the owners delivered their shares to an escrow. Closing was deferred for five years, during which the sellers agreed to vote their shares as Emmis instructed. Emmis did this because, once it purchased any share outright, it would be retired and lose voting rights, Ind. Code 23-1-25-3(a). Emmis repurchased addition preferred stock in a tender offer and reissued it to a trust for bonuses to workers who stuck with the firm through the financial downturn. The trustee was to vote this stock at management’s direction. Senior managers and members of the board were excluded, leaving them free to propose and vote without a conflict of interest. The plans allowed Emmis to control more than 2/3 of the votes. Emmis then called on owners of common and preferred stock to vote on whether the terms of the preferred stock should be changed. The cumulative feature of the stock’s dividends and other rights were eliminated. Plaintiffs, who own remaining preferred stock, sued. The district court rejected claims under federal and Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana, apparently alone among the states, allows a corporation to vote its own shares, which may be good, or may be bad, but the ability to negotiate better terms, or invest elsewhere, rather than judicially imposed “best practices,” is how corporate law protects investors View "Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Fry solicited funds from investors for promissory notes issued by Petters, stating that the notes would finance purchases of merchandise that would be resold at a profit. In fact, the notes were part of a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Petters, who was convicted separately. The transactions were fictitious, documentation was fabricated, and early investors were paid purported profits with money raised from the sale of notes to later investors. From 1999-2008, Fry and his recruits raised more than $500 million. Fry continued to misrepresent the investments and to solicit investments after the scheme began to unravel, causing $130 million in losses for 44 victims, while he collected tens of millions of dollars in fees. Fry made false statements to the SEC during its investigation. He was convicted of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), 77x ,18 U.S.C. 2; wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; and making false statements to the SEC, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). The district court sentenced Fry to 210 months’ imprisonment. Other participants in the Petters scheme pleaded guilty to various charges and were sentenced by the same judge. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Fry’s conviction and sentence, rejecting an argument that it should presume that the court sentenced him vindictively, in retaliation for his exercise of the right to a jury trial, because Fry’s sentence was longer than sentences imposed on defendants who pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Fry" on Justia Law

Hansen, a farmer, served as a bank trust officer. In 2003, he invested, through Johnson (a stock broker), in the Hudson Fund, a hedge fund Johnson ran with Onsa and Puma. Hansen continued investing with the three. In 2007 Hansen and Johnson formed RAHFCO limited partnership. Hansen served as general partner, but delegated responsibility for executing trades to the Hudson Fund. Hansen misrepresented RAHFCO to investors, directly and through a private placement memo. Hansen prepared and sent investors earnings statements that falsely inflated RAHFCO’s performance. Hansen later testified that he relied on Onsa and Johnson to provide the numbers and never confirmed them. Hansen hired an accounting firm for an audit, but the firm quit after Hansen refused to authorize it to obtain a brokerage statement confirming RAHFCO’s investments. RAHFCO’s law firm withdrew. Johnson was charged in 2007 with securities fraud concerning another company. Onsa was sued civilly for fraudulent securities trading in 2009. Hansen never informed investors of any of these events nor did he attempt to find another auditor. In 2011, RAHFCO collapsed. Convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1349, Hansen was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and ordered to pay $17 million restitution to 75 victims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the use of a willful blindness instruction and an instruction on conspiracy. View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

After Lehman entered into a Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(A), liquidation, Doral submitted timely claims asserting that it was entitled to recover the profit from a repurchased agreement. The SIPA Trustee denied these claims, concluding that Doral was not a “customer” of Lehman, and therefore was not protected by SIPA. Doral promptly objected to the Trustee’s denial, but shortly thereafter transferred its claims to CarVal. The bankruptcy court affirmed the Trustee's determination that the repos did not make Doral or CarVal a customer under SIPA. The court concluded that an investor who delivers securities to a broker‐dealer as part of a repurchase agreement is not protected by SIPA because the investor did not entrust assets to the broker‐dealer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower courts' determination that CarVal is not a customer for purposes of SIPA. View "CarVal v. Giddens" on Justia Law

Rodd, an investment advisor who produced and was regularly featured on a Minnesota local radio show, “Safe Money Radio,” was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for swindling 23 investors out of $1.8 million. Rodd used the radio show to market low-risk investment products to gain customers’ trust and maintain a client base for soliciting participants in a fraudulent investment scheme. Rodd solicited money by promising liquidity, safety, and a 60% six-month return. Rodd instead used the money for personal and business expenses, hiding behind false assurances of security and payouts to his early investors. Finding an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, the district court sentenced Rodd to 87 months in prison, applying a two-level enhancement for abusing a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the finding that Rodd occupied a position of trust. As a self-employed investment advisor, Rodd was subject to no oversight except by his investors. The discretion and control he possessed over client funds adequately supported the finding. The court did not err in failing to apply a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Rodd took his case to trial and denied his guilt to the end. View "United States v. Rodd" on Justia Law