Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. ("the Fund"), appealed a circuit court's order denying the Fund's motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award. The Fund entrusted the management and investment of approximately $50 million in assets to Morgan Asset Management, Inc. ("MAM"), and Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. ("Morgan Keegan"). MAM served as an investment advisor for a managed account and certain mutual funds owned by the Fund. Morgan Keegan served as the broker-dealer for the Fund's managed account and had the authority as the broker-dealer to execute transactions in that account as directed by the Fund. A second account at Morgan Keegan held the mutual funds that had been sold to the Fund through a Morgan Keegan broker. The Fund stated that it directed MAM and Morgan Keegan to invest its funds conservatively and that it relied on MAM and Morgan Keegan for sound financial advice and management. However, according to the Fund, MAM and Morgan Keegan disregarded this mandate by recommending that the Fund purchase and hold what the Fund says were unsuitable investments, by overconcentrating the Fund's assets in investments that had undue exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and in other risky investments, and by misrepresenting and failing to disclose material facts pertaining to the investments. The Fund claims that it sustained losses in excess of $15 million in 2007 and 2008 as a result of the actions of MAM and Morgan Keegan. The Fund initiated arbitration proceedings against MAM and Morgan Keegan by filing a statement of claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in its contracts with MAM and Morgan Keegan, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; negligence; fraud; violations of NASD and NYSE Rules; and violations of the Alabama Securities Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded from the admissible evidence entered at trial, the Fund established an evident partiality on the part of one of the arbitrators, and that the Fund was entitled to have the judgment entered on the arbitration award vacated. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Municipal Workers Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

Greyfield Capital was a defunct Canadian company. Two "con-men" found a signature stamp belonging to the company's former president, and used it as an officially-sanctioned "seal" to appoint themselves corporate officers, issue millions of unregistered shares in their names. The men then took the unregistered, issued shares to create a penny stock "pump-and-dump" scheme. Regulators began looking for those who had helped facilitate the sale of Greyfield's unregistered shares. Regulators were led to petitioners ACAP and Gary Hume. ACAP was a penny stock brokerage firm in Salt Lake City, and Gary Hume was its head trader and compliance manager. Petitioners did not dispute their liability stemming from the Greyfield scheme, rather, they disputed the sanctions they received. FINRA decided to fine ACAP $100,000 and Mr. Hume $25,000, and to suspend Hume from the securities industry for six months. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reviewed and sustained these sanctions. ACAP and Hume then petitioned the Tenth Circuit to appeal the SEC's decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit could not "see how [it] might overturn the agency's decision." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the SEC's decision. View "ACAP Financial v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, Eminence Investors, LLLP (Plaintiff) brought suit against against The Bank of New York Mellon (Defendant). Nearly two years later, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding class allegations on behalf of more than 100 class members and requesting compensatory damages expected to exceed $10 million. Within thirty days of the filing of the complaint, Defendant removed the action to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court. The district court remanded the case to state court, concluding that removal was untimely. Defendant appealed. A panel of the Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the appeal, holding that the securities exception from CAFA removal applied to this case. View "Eminence Investors, LLLP v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, Carlos Zelaya and George Glantz, were victims of one of the largest Ponzi schemes in American history: the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by R. Allen Stanford. Plaintiffs were taken by surprise, yet, according to Plaintiffs, the federal agency entrusted with the duty of trying to prevent, or at least reveal, Ponzi schemes was not all that surprised. To the contrary, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), had been alerted over a decade before that Stanford was likely running a Ponzi operation. According to Plaintiffs, notwithstanding its knowledge of Stanford’s likely nefarious dealings, the SEC dithered for twelve years, "content not to call out Stanford and protect future investors from his fraud." And though the SEC eventually took action in 2009, many people lost most of their investments. Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, Plaintiffs sued the United States in federal court, alleging that the SEC had acted negligently. The federal government moved to dismiss, arguing that it enjoyed sovereign immunity from the lawsuit. The district court agreed, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs appealed that dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, the Court reached no conclusions as to the SEC’s conduct, or whether the latter’s actions deserved Plaintiffs’ condemnation. The Court did, however, conclude that the United States was shielded from liability for the SEC’s alleged negligence in this case. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ complaint. View "Zelaya v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for failure to register as a securities salesperson, failure to register a security, and fraudulent practices, all felonies. The district court sentenced him to three concurrent ten-year sentences with all but ninety days suspended, plus restitution and court costs. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for fraudulent practices and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the term “security” was adequately defined for the jury; (2) the State provided sufficient evidence to prove Defendant sold a security; (3) the district court correctly instructed the jury in accordance with the statutory definition of “willfully”; (4) sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding that Defendant had the requisite mental state to violate the Securities Act, and because Defendant was not convicted of a strict liability offense, his ten-year sentence did not violate his due process rights; (5) the district court erred by instructing the jury that the willful omission of a prospectus constituted fraudulent practices; and (6) Defendant was properly sentenced. Remanded for a new trial on the fraudulent practices charge. View "State v. Himes" on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal before the Eleventh Circuit centered on an order granting motions to dismiss by two defendants in a securities class action against Jiangbo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., its principal officers, and its audit firm. Jiangbo came into existence as a U.S. corporation in 2007 when its Chinese operational arm, Laiyang Jiangbo, executed a reverse merger with a Florida shell company. Jiangbo's tenure as a public company "was short and fraught with suspicion of misconduct." Shares began trading on NASDAQ on June 8, 2010 and traded on that exchange for just under a year. Only six months after trading began, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an informal, non-public investigation into Jiangbo. The company's fortunes unraveled quickly soon thereafter, and the SEC formalized its investigation, which remained non-public. Jiangbo made two significant disclosures in late May 2011 that marked the culmination of its decline: it publicly acknowledged the formal SEC investigation for the first time and reported that the company had defaulted on a relatively small principal payment toward debt from its initial financing. Trading ended days later on May 31, 2011, by which time the share price had fallen from a class-period high of $10.49 per share to $3.08. By November 2011, after Jiangbo had moved to another exchange, its shares were trading for just $0.14. The investors' consolidated amended complaint alleged, inter alia, that Elsa Sung (the former Chief Financial Officer) and Frazer LLP (the external auditor) misrepresented the company's cash balances and failed to disclose a material related-party transaction in statements within or appurtenant to those filings, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The district court found that the investors failed to sufficiently plead their allegations of fraud against defendants Sung and Frazer LLP ("Frazer"). Applying the heightened pleading standard imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "Brophy v. Jiangbo Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a suit brought by Sanderson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging that auditors (defendants) committed securities fraud by falsely representing that they performed their audits of Advanced Battery Technologies in accordance with professional standards and that the company’s filings accurately reflected its financial condition from the 2007 through the 2010 fiscal years. The court found that the complaint failed adequately to plead scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 78u‐4. Sanderson sought to correct these deficiencies by moving to file an amended complaint. The court denied the motion, concluding that even the new allegations failed to “rise to the level of recklessness.” The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the factual allegations did not give rise to a strong inference of either fraudulent intent or conscious recklessness, rather than mere negligence. View "In re: Advanced Battery Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Securities Act of 1933 requires that a company issuing securities file a registration statement containing specified information, 15 U.S.C. 77aa. The statement may include other representations of fact or opinion. A purchaser of securities may sue an issuer if it either “contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact” or “omit[s] to state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” The buyer need not prove intent to deceive. Omnicare filed a registration statement for a public offering of common stock. In addition to required disclosures, the statement expressed the company’s opinion that it was in compliance with federal and state laws. After the government sued Omnicare for receiving kickbacks from pharmaceutical manufacturers, purchasers of Omnicare Funds sued, claiming that the legal-compliance statements constituted “untrue statement[s] of . . . material fact” and that Omnicare “omitted to state [material] facts necessary” to make those statements not misleading. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that subjective disbelief was not required. The Supreme Court vacated. A statement of opinion is not an “untrue statement of . . . fact” simply because that opinion ultimately proves incorrect. Opinions qualify as untrue statements of fact if the opinion was not sincerely held or if they contain embedded statements of untrue facts. Under section 11’s omissions clause, whether a statement is “misleading” is an objective inquiry based on a reasonable investor’s perspective. A reasonable investor may understand an opinion to convey facts about the speaker’s basis for holding that view; if the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion will mislead by omission. An opinion, however, is not misleading simply because the issuer knows, but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way. Section 11 creates liability only for the omission of material facts that cannot be squared with a fair reading of the registration as a whole. The case was remanded for determination of whether the complaint adequately alleged that Omnicare omitted some fact that would have been material to a reasonable investor. View "Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of investors, filed this suit claiming that Chelsea Therapeutics International, LTD. and several of its corporate officers violated the Securities Exchange Act by making misleading statements and material omissions about the development and likelihood of regulatory approval for a new drug. The district court dismissed the claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that Plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims failed because their allegations were insufficient to establish that Defendants acted with the required scienter. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the district court erred in (1) taking judicial notice of three documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission because those documents were not explicitly referenced in, or an integral part of, Plaintiffs’ complaint, and the error was not harmless; and (2) concluding that Plaintiffs’ allegations of scienter were insufficient as a matter of law, as, based on Defendants’ failure to disclose critical information about the weaknesses of the new drug application, Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to support the required inference of scienter. Remanded. View "Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l" on Justia Law

Between 2004 and 2009, Stryker submitted information to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Division regarding alleged wrongdoing by ATG and an involved individual. In 2009, the SEC opened an investigation and interviewed Stryker. The SEC subsequently filed an enforcement action against ATG and the individual, charging them with violating Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. In 2010, the SEC reached a settlement with the respondents to the enforcement action. The district court approved the settlement, whereby ATG and the individual were held liable for more than $19 million. In 2011, Stryker sought a whistleblower award under Section 21F of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6, based on the successful enforcement action. The SEC denied the award because the information was submitted before enactment of Dodd-Frank. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the SEC’s interpretation was within its authority and consistent with the legislation. View "Stryker v. Secs. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law