Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, purchasers of securities issued by JinkoSolar in two public offerings, appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint alleging violations of the federal securities laws. JinkoSolar manufactures various solar cells and solar panel products. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that serious pollution problems rendered misleading statements in a prospectus describing prophylactic measures taken to comply with Chinese environmental regulations. View "Meyer v. JinkoSolar Holding Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of investors, filed suit alleging that Electronic Game Card's former CEO and CFO violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, and that others violated section 20(a) of the Act. The court concluded that the district court did not properly strike allegations and exhibits from the Third Amended Complaint because the Auditor discovery materials at issue were not obtained in violation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(3)(B). The court also concluded that the Third Amended Complaint adequately pleaded false statements and scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Petrie v. Electronic Game Card, Inc." on Justia Law

The SEC sought a court order compelling SIPC to liquidate a member broker-dealer, SGC. SGC played an integral role in a multibillion-dollar financial fraud carried out through a web of companies. At issue was whether SIPC could instead be ordered to proceed against SGC to protect the CD investors' property. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the application to order SIPC to liquidate SGC where, under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78ccc(a)(1), the CD investors did not qualify as customers of SGC under the operative statutory definition. View "SEC v. Securities Investor Protection Corp." on Justia Law

FutureSelect invested nearly $200 million in the Rye Funds, which pooled and fed money into Bernard Madoff's fraudulent securities investment scheme. The investments were lost when Madoff's fraud collapsed. FutureSelect sued Tremont Group Holdings (proponent of the Rye Funds), Oppenheimer Acquisition Corporation and Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (Tremont's parent companies) and Ernst & Young, LLP (Tremont's auditor) for their failure to conduct due diligence on Madoff's investments. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding Washington's security law did not apply, and that Washington courts lacked jurisdiction over Oppenheimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the defendants sought to reinstate the trial court's findings. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' decision, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Futureselect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors, alleged that they purchased defendants' stock in reliance of defendants' material misrepresentations. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their claims for securities fraud in accordance with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 and 78u-5; the court need not consider the parties' arguments as to whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint; and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Houston Amer. Energy Corp." on Justia Law

PRS filed a class action against Intuitive on behalf of purchasers of Intuitive common stock, alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b.5, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. PRS alleged that Intuitive, through its executives, knowingly issued false and misleading statements regarding the company's growth and financial health which caused artificial inflation of the share price. The court concluded that, read as a whole, PRS's allegations did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirements imposed in the securities fraud cases and did not identify any material misstatements made with scienter. Intuitive's statements were mostly forward-looking statements or garden variety corporate optimism, and PRS failed to suggest that the executives made false statements with knowing or reckless disregard for Intuitive's economic circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. View "Police Retirement Sys. v. Intuitive Surgical" on Justia Law

In August 2007, the initial trustee of two family trusts invested millions in the Rockwater American Municipal Fund, LLC (RAM Fund), a hedge fund engaged in municipal arbitrage. The RAM Fund was managed by Rockwater Municipal Advisors, LLC (RMA), its managing member. In November 2007, Charles Fish Investments, Inc. (CFI) transferred its assets to Rockwater CFI, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of RMA, in exchange for a 15 percent interest in RMA. CFI had an option to unwind the transaction, if its interest in RMA did not meet certain benchmark values. The RAM Fund was devastated by the stock market crash and the trust investments were largely wiped out by 2008. CFI exercised its option to unwind the transaction with RMA and Rockwater CFI, LLC, and obtained a return of the assets originally belonging to it. The successor trustee of the trusts sued the RAM Fund, RMA, Bryan Williams (founder of the RAM Fund and the chief executive officer of RMA), John Hapke (the chief financial officer of the RAM Fund), CFI, and Charles Fish (the chairman and chief executive officer of CFI). After it had seen clips from the movie Wall Street 2 (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) and a power point presentation with eight screens captioned "Greed," a jury awarded the successor trustee a $4.6 million judgment against the RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke. The successor trustee was unsuccessful in obtaining a judgment against CFI and Fish. The RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke, on the other hand, have each filed an appeal claiming the RAM Fund was simply the victim of the market crash. The successor trustee appealed too, seeking to hold liable CFI and Fish, the defendants who "got away." After review, the Supreme Court: reversed the judgment in favor of RAM, RMA and Willians, and affirmed the judgment against CFI and Fish on actual and constructive fraudulent transfer; to the extent the judgment held the Rockwater Defendants and Hapke liable on the causes of action for fraud by intentional misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and/or negligent misrepresentation, it was reversed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment against the RAM Fund and Hapke for breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence was reversed. However, the judgment against RMA and Williams on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was affirmed. The ruling that CFI was not liable for the debts of RMA was affirmed. The ruling that Fish was not liable for the debts of CFI was moot, and the judgment in favor of CFI on all causes of action is affirmed. View "Hasso v. Hapke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of insider defendants' motion to dismiss her short-swing trading complaint. The court agreed with the district court that the requirements of a claim under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b), mandating disgorgement of short-swing profits by statutory insiders, had not been satisfied. The prepaid variable forward contracts in this case were properly analyzed under traditional, and not hybrid, derivative analysis. When that was done, it became evidence that no "purchase" occurred against which a "sale could be matched for section 16(b) purposes. View "Chechele v. Sperling" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether alleged misrepresentations made by Defendants were made “in connection with” a transaction in covered securities under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). Plaintiffs, investors in a licensed non-diversified investment company, filed a putative class action in Puerto Rico court against the Fund and others alleging fraud or misrepresentation in violation of Puerto Rico law after the Fund invested the majority of its assets in notes sold by Lehman Brothers, resulting in the Fund adopting a plan of liquidation. Defendants removed the action to the federal district court, asserting that it fell within the ambit of the SLUSA. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought remand on jurisdictional grounds. Ultimately, the district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss premised on SLUSA preclusion. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and remitted with instructions to return the case to the Puerto Rico Court, holding that the link between the misrepresentations alleged and the covered securities in the Fund’s portfolio was too fragile to support a finding of SLUSA preclusion under Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice. View "Hidalgo-Velez v. San Juan Asset Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this complaint on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Chesapeake common stock from 2009 to 2012, and who were damaged from those purchases/acquisitions. The complaint alleged that Defendants materially misled the public through false statements and omissions regarding two different types of financial obligations: (1) Volumetric Production Payment transactions (under which Chesapeake received immediate cash in exchange for the promise to produce and deliver gas over time); and (2) the Founder Well Participation Program (under which Chesapeake CEO Aubrey McClendon was allowed to purchase up to a 2.5% interest in the new gas wells drilled in a given year). With respect to the "VPP program," Plaintiffs alleged Defendants touted the more than $6.3 billion raised through these transactions but failed to disclose that the VPPs would require Chesapeake to incur future production costs totaling approximately $1.4 billion. Plaintiffs contended the failure to disclose these future production costs was a material omission that misled investors into believing there would be no substantial costs associated with Chesapeake’s obligations to produce and deliver gas over time. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs had failed to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Viewing all of the allegations in the complaint collectively, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded they gave rise to a cogent and compelling inference of scienter. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Weinstein, et al v. McClendon, et al" on Justia Law