Justia Securities Law Opinion Summaries

A stockholder of Republic, a Delaware corporation that engages in waste hauling and waste disposal, filed a derivative suit based on Republic’s compensation decisions: that a payment to O’Connor was made without consideration and was, therefore, wasteful; that an incentive payment to O’Connor was wasteful because it was not tax-deductible and rendered Republic’s compensation plan not tax-deductible; that Directors paid themselves excessive compensation; that Directors breached their duty of loyalty and wasted corporate assets by awarding a certain type of stock option; and that Directors improperly awarded employee bonuses because the requirements of the bonus scheme under which the bonuses were awarded were not met. The chancellor dismissed all but the claim arising from the board’s granting itself stock awards.View "Frank David Seinfeld v. Donald W. Slager, et al." on Justia Law

This case presented a battle between banks over the proceeds of the sale of cattle by a financially strapped borrower who had financial dealings with both banks. When Security Savings Bank (Security) obtained the proceeds of the sale, Peoples Trust and Savings Bank (Peoples) claimed a security interest in the proceeds and sued for conversion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples. After Security appealed, Peoples commenced garnishment proceedings against Security to enforce its judgment, and Security paid the underlying judgment. The court of appeals then determined that Security had waived its right to appeal and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant faced with post-judgment garnishment does not waive a pending appeal by paying the judgment in order to avoid further enforcement proceedings; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Peoples had a security interest in the proceeds superior to Security's interest and that Peoples did not waive its superior position through its course of conduct.View "Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v. Sec. Savings Bank" on Justia Law

In these cross-motions for partial summary judgment, at issue was whether ION violated the rights of its preferred stockholder, Fletcher, by causing a wholly-owned ION subsidiary to issue certain promissory notes without Fletcher's approval in connection with ION's purchase of a business. The court agreed with the parties that to determine whether the notes were securities was an issue appropriate for summary judgment. On the merits, however, the court held that it did not agree with ION's argument that all notes issued as compensation to a seller of a business by the buyer of that business were not securities. The court concluded that two of the promissory notes issued to the business seller by the ION subsidiary were not securities because they were most sensibly characterized as short-term commercial bridge financing to facilitate the closing of the acquisition transaction. But the court concluded that the third note was a security. Accordingly, the court found that Fletcher's consent rights under the Certificates were not breached by the issuance of the first two notes, but were breached when ION caused its subsidiary to issue the third note.View "Fletcher Int'l, Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., et al." on Justia Law

This action involved claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary against an individual defendant, a former investment professional accused of having committed a massive fraud related to a quantitatively-based trading program that he allegedly developed to trade futures contracts. Plaintiffs, as a result of their association with defendant and Paron, the firm they founded with defendant, claimed that they have been stigmatized and thus face dismal prospects of finding employment in the financial services industry. The court found that defendant committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duties to plaintiff and Paron by making false statements of fact about his program, his investment track record, and his personal financial situation. As a result, plaintiffs were entitled to extensive damages against defendant based on their lost future earnings and other costs associated with the formation and operation of Paron. The court also awarded plaintiffs limited injunctive relief requiring defendant to destroy or return copies of Paron's trading program and to stop marketing any versions of that trading program.View "Paron Capital Mgmt., LLC, et al. v. Crombie" on Justia Law

In 2006,Jefferson County purchased securities through Capital Securities, Inc., Jerry Manning, and Adam Alves a purchase later determined unlawful under section 24-75-601.1, C.R.S. (2008). The county sued Capital Securities and, among other things, sought to disgorge the commissions earned by Capital Securities under a theory of common law restitution. Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that restitution was appropriate and ordered Capital Securities to disgorge their commissions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine whether restitution is an appropriate remedy in this context. Upon review, the Court held that it was not, and reversed the court of appeals: "The statutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly expressly sets forth a number of remedies available to a public entity against a seller when . . .the public entity unlawfully purchases securities under section 24-75-601.1. These remedies include forcing the seller to repurchase the securities 'for the greater of the original purchase principal amount or the original face value, plus any and all accrued interest, within one business day of the demand.' . . . Further, the securities commissioner may, inter alia, suspend or revoke a seller's license or license exemption if he 'knew or should have known' the securities were unlawful under section 24-75-601.1. sec. 11-51-410(k), C.R.S. (2011); sec. 11-51-402(4)(a), C.R.S. (2011)."View "Capital Securities, Inc. v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought their Verified Complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. J.P.Morgan also asserted a claim for attorneys' fees and costs under an option agreement that J.P. Morgan and defendant entered into, which was the contract central to the dispute. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that J.P. Morgan has failed to state a claim that defendant breached the express terms of the Option Agreement and therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count II because J.P. Morgan's allegations, taken together, were sufficient to state a claim of the implied covenant. Finally, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count III where J.P. Morgan could eventually be the prevailing party in this action.View "JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. American Century Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a 15% partner in defendant Peconic Partners (hedge fund), as well as Chief Compliance Officer. Plaintiff alleged that he was subsequently fired after a dispute with Peconic Partners' CEO and President (Defendant Harnisch). The gist of plaintiff's claim was that the legal and ethical duties of a securities firm and its compliance officer justified recognizing a cause of action for damages when the compliance officer was fired for objecting to misconduct. The court held in Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp that New York common law did not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee. Therefore, the court declined in this case to make an exception to that rule for the compliance of a hedge fund.View "Sullivan v Harnisch" on Justia Law

Earl and Nawana Wallace (the Senior Wallaces) borrowed $15,789 from Pinnacle Bank - Wyoming to finance a vehicle the Senior Wallaces purchased for their son and his wife (the Junior Wallaces). The collateral for the loan was the vehicle the Senior Wallaces bought for and titled in the Junior Wallaces' names. To that end, the Junior Wallaces signed a third party security agreement pledging the vehicle as collateral. The Junior Wallaces subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustees eventually sold the vehicle to benefit the bankruptcy estate. The Senior Wallaces thereafter stopped making payments on the loan. Pinnacle then filed a complaint seeking damages in the amount of the principal due on the note. The district court granted Pinnacle's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of the Senior Wallaces' asserted defenses excused them from meeting their loan obligation. View "Wallace v. Pinnacle Bank - Wyo." on Justia Law

Defendant Randy J. Rouleau appealed the decision of the Washington Civil Division which held that Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., as Trustee for the registered holders of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Security Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-CF2 (Wells Fargo), was entitled to enforce his personal guaranty of a promissory note secured by mortgages on five mobile home parks.  The civil division concluded that Wells Fargo could enforce the guaranty as the holder of the note under 9A V.S.A. § 3-301(i), which defines who may enforce a negotiable instrument.  Defendant argued that the court erred in ruling that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty because Wells Fargo could not prove the chain of assignments from the original lender to itself and therefore that Wells Fargo, and not some third party, is the assignee of the guaranty.  Defendant also argued that the court erred in treating assignment of the note as sufficient to show assignment of the guaranty because the guaranty, in contrast to the note, is a separate contract that must be expressly assigned.  Finally, defendant argued that because Wells Fargo lacked standing to enforce the guaranty, the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action.  Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the court's finding that Wells Fargo was assigned the note and mortgage was clearly erroneous.  Moreover, the court's finding on this point, essential to Wells Fargo's status as a holder, directly supports its conclusion that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty.  Because Wells Fargo had standing, Defendant's final argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action has no merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau" on Justia Law

These three consolidated appeals (all springing from a divorce granted in 1994) presented thirty-eight issues including one of first impression. A judgment creditor served writs of execution on two corporations whose restricted stock was owned by the judgment debtor, who then sold his stock back to the corporations. The chancellor dismissed the writs, holding that the sale of stock rendered them moot. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of restricted shares of corporate stock apply to both voluntary and involuntary transfers of the shares; that after a judgment creditor serves a corporation with a writ of execution regarding one of its shareholders, repurchasing the shareholder’s shares will not excuse the corporation from responding to the writ of execution by filing the statutorily required sworn statement; and that the judgment creditor may (to the extent allowed by Mississippi statutes and other applicable law) execute on all benefits due the judgment debtor by the corporation, including the purchase price of the judgment debtor’s stock. Because the Court reversed the chancellor on three issues and remanded for a new trial, and because the chancellor's resolution of those issues may affect the outcome of others, the Court held that all issues not specifically resolved in this opinion could be presented by the parties to the chancellor for adjudication.View "West v. West" on Justia Law